An Investigation Into Utah’s Constitutional Power Structure:
The Struggle for Constitutional Authority and the People’s Right to Govern
Prepared by The Republic Project Investigators
Edited by Ed Wallace, Founder
Article VI, Section 1 recognizes legislative authority in both the people and their elected representatives. Amendment B would require 60% voter approval for specified citizen-initiated tax measures while leaving the Legislature’s existing voting rules unchanged. If both exercise constitutionally recognized legislative power, what justifies imposing a higher threshold on the people?
FOUNDER’S FOREWORD
The Question of Power
There is a fundamental question at the heart of this investigation, and I believe it deserves a direct answer.
Who is supposed to control the government of Utah: the people, or the people they elect?
My conclusion is that Amendments A and B represent another effort to shift the balance of constitutional authority toward the Legislature and away from the citizens it is supposed to serve.
The most consequential changes to government authority rarely arrive with an announcement that the public is about to lose something. They are presented as reasonable reforms, necessary safeguards, or administrative improvements.
That is precisely why they deserve close examination.
The question is not simply what these amendments promise. It is what they would actually do.
Who gains authority? Who loses an existing safeguard? What becomes easier for the Legislature? What becomes more difficult for the people? And why are these changes necessary in the first place?
And that brings me to Amendment B, a proposal so remarkable in its underlying premise that it deserves a moment of special attention. Amendment B is apparently designed to protect Utah taxpayers from the most alarming threat of all: themselves.
Apparently, Utah has reached a point in its history where legislators fear that ordinary citizens, left to their own devices, might gather signatures, organize campaigns, persuade their neighbors, and then march to the polls demanding the privilege of paying higher taxes.
Imagine the danger.
Thousands of hardworking Utahns, burdened by mortgages, grocery bills, property taxes, and the rising cost of living, might suddenly develop an irresistible urge to surrender more of their earnings to government.
Fortunately, the Legislature stands ready to save them from this epidemic of taxpayer generosity.
The same institution that possesses the authority to enact tax increases through its ordinary legislative procedures now proposes a constitutional safeguard against certain tax increases initiated by the people themselves.
I confess that I have difficulty identifying the public emergency.
I have encountered plenty of citizens angry about taxes. I have seen them organize, petition, protest, and challenge tax decisions made by their government. Our report documents examples of precisely that conduct.
What I have not been shown is a comparable history of Utah taxpayers clamoring to increase their own taxes through statewide initiatives, so recklessly and so frequently that the Constitution must be amended to restrain them.
Before legislators protect the people from themselves, perhaps they should first demonstrate that the danger exists. If not, Utahns should consider the possibility that the proposed safeguard is aimed less at an established taxpayer problem than at the independent lawmaking authority of the people.
One might reasonably ask whether the people need protection from their own votes, or whether their representatives would prefer additional protection from the people’s constitutional power.
I regard that as a serious question, however absurd the underlying premise may sound.
I have spent years examining the distance between political promises and governmental conduct. One lesson continues to stand out:
Power should be judged by what it does, not merely by what its holders say they intend.
The Constitution is not a collection of political conveniences to be adjusted whenever public participation becomes uncomfortable. It is the instrument by which the people establish and limit their government.
In my judgment, the structure and consequences of Amendments A and B tell a more troubling story than their public presentation suggests. I believe the proposals are framed to appear measured and constructive while obscuring the significance of the constitutional power they would redistribute.
But intent is not the only issue. The consequences of constitutional language matter regardless of the assurances offered by its sponsors.
The Legislature has legitimate constitutional powers. So do the people. Those powers are not interchangeable, and the people’s reserved authority is not a privilege granted at the Legislature’s discretion.
Some readers will disagree with my conclusions. I encourage them to examine the documents, consider the arguments, and reach their own judgments. That is exactly what responsible citizenship requires.
Changing our Constitution is a drastic step that demands ironclad justification, not slogans and assurances from the very officials seeking greater control.
The Utah Constitution belongs to the people of Utah. Their reserved powers are not inconveniences to be managed. They are safeguards to be respected.
And whenever those safeguards are placed in question, the people deserve the whole story.
Ed Wallace
Founder, The Republic Project
Publisher, Utah Standard News
RELATED: Amendment A: Did Utah’s Lawmakers Forget to Put on Their Thinking Caps?
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
The Story Behind the Amendments 1
Sources & Documentation – CLICK HERE 7
PDF Copy of this Report – CLICK HERE 7
What This Investigation Reveals 7
The Central Constitutional Question 9
The Conflict That Started With Proposition 4 9
The Next Chapter: Amendments A and B 10
The Unanswered Question Behind Amendment B 10
The People Behind the Proposals 10
The Money, the Messaging, and the Public Record 10
The Oath of Office and Constitutional Accountability 10
Is There a Deep State in Utah? 10
The Question Utahns Must Answer 10
The Questions Voters Will See on Their Ballots 10
The Government Belongs to the People, Not the Other Way Around 10
Section 2: Proposition 4, The Vote That Started the Constitutional Confrontation 12
Subsequent Judicial Proceedings, 2025–2026 17
Section 3: Amendment D, The Attempt to Rewrite the Rules 17
When the Court Said No, the Legislature Turned to the Constitution 17
What Amendment D Would Have Changed 18
The Official Explanation and the People Who Wrote It 19
The Publication Requirement the Legislature Failed to Meet 20
Two Separate Constitutional Failures 20
The Political Response and the Question of Responsibility 21
The Connection to Amendment A 22
The Larger Constitutional Question 23
Section 4: Amendment A, Modernizing Public Notice or Changing a Constitutional Safeguard? 24
The Requirement That Stopped Amendment D 24
A New Amendment With an Old Connection 25
Who Should Control the Safeguards? 25
An Unusual Degree of Agreement 26
Modernization, Accountability, and the Constitutional Boundary 27
A Broader Legislative History Worth Examining 28
Section 5: Amendment B, Taxpayer Protection or a Higher Barrier for Citizen Initiatives? 30
A Different Amendment, a Familiar Constitutional Question 30
The Argument for Protecting Taxpayers 30
Where Is the Evidence of the Problem Amendment B Is Intended to Solve? 31
What the Recent Record Shows 31
The Roy Case Deserves Attention 32
An Overlooked Point: Utah Already Regulates Tax Initiatives 32
The Practical Meaning of Sixty Percent 34
The Historical Context Cannot Be Ignored 34
What the Voters Are Really Deciding 35
Section 6: The People Behind the Amendments 36
Legislative Leadership, Political Alliances, and the Struggle Over Constitutional Authority 36
Amendment A: Anthony Loubet and Daniel McCay 36
Amendment B: Lincoln Fillmore and Jason Kyle 37
The Leadership Question: Adams, Schultz, and Cullimore 38
The Continuing Effort to Restore Legislative Authority 39
Legislative Relationships and Political Influence 39
What the Legislative Record Reveals 40
The Question Behind the Names 41
Section 7: A Pattern of Legislative Power 41
Coincidence, Constitutional Philosophy, or Coordinated Strategy? 41
The Pattern Behind the Individual Battles 41
Two Competing Understandings of Representative Government 42
The Procedural Changes That Deserve Attention 43
The Difference Between a Pattern and a Conspiracy 43
What Would Establish Coordination? 44
Section 8: Following the Money 45
Political Organizations, Campaign Contributions, and Influence 45
The Financial Trail Behind Constitutional Politics 45
The Utah Taxpayers Association: Advocacy and Political Access 46
Taxpayer Shield PAC: A More Direct Connection 47
Documented Overlapping Leadership Between Political Action Committees 48
The Other Side of the Campaign 48
Contributions Are Evidence of Relationships, Not Proof of Control 49
The Missing Pieces of the Financial Record 49
Section 9: Money, Media, and Public Messaging 51
Watchdogs, Messengers, or Participants? 51
The Media’s Constitutional Role 51
Utah News Dispatch: Following the Institutional Conflict 52
KUER: Explaining the Ballot to Ordinary Voters 53
The Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret News, and KSL 53
The Weber County Hive: Following the Records Others May Overlook 54
Political Advertising: Information for Sale 55
When Does Media Bias Become Media Collusion? 56
What Was Explained, and What Was Missing? 57
Section 10: The Oath of Office and the Constitutional Limits of Government Power 58
When Elected Officials Disagree With the Constitution They Swore to Uphold 58
A Promise That Should Mean Something 59
The Constitution Is Not a Grant of Unlimited Authority 59
The Difference Between Changing the Law and Evading It 60
Can Lawmakers Change the Rules That Restrict Them? 61
The Legislature, the Courts, and the Separation of Powers 62
When Does an Oath Become an Accountability Issue? 62
Who Watches the People Who Make the Rules? 63
The Standard We Should Expect 64
Section 11: The Verdict of the Evidence 65
What Utah Voters Deserve to Know 65
The Question That Started It All 65
What the Evidence Establishes 65
What Amendments A and B Would Actually Do 66
The People, the Organizations, and the Money 67
Is There a Deep State in Utah? 68
What Voters Should Consider 70
Questions to Principal Actors and Organizations 71
An Opportunity to Respond to the Documentary Record 71
Email introduction sent to all recipients: 72
12.2 House Speaker Mike Schultz 74
12.3 Senator Kirk Cullimore 74
12.4 Representative Anthony Loubet 75
12.6 Senator Lincoln Fillmore 76
12.7 Representative Jason Kyle 76
12.8 Utah Taxpayers Association 77
12.9a Questions for Billy Hesterman 77
12.10 Utah Lieutenant Governor’s Office 79
12.11 Questions for Elizabeth Rasmussen, Better Boundaries 79
12.12 Questions for Alliance for a Better Utah 80
Sources & Documentation – CLICK HERE
PDF Copy of this Report – CLICK HERE
Site Address: https://republicstratagems.com/2026/10/23/the-story-behind-utahs-2026-amendments-a-b/
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
What This Investigation Reveals
What happens when citizens exercise their constitutional rights in ways their elected representatives oppose? And what happens when the courts enforce constitutional limits on the government’s response?
These questions lie at the heart of The Republic Project’s investigation into Utah’s proposed 2026 constitutional Amendments A and B.
The report examines legislative actions, citizen initiatives, court decisions, constitutional proposals, political relationships, and public campaigns to determine how the balance of authority between Utah’s citizens and their elected representatives may be affected.
Principal Findings
1. The people retain constitutional authority.
Utah’s Constitution declares that political power is inherent in the people and reserves the powers of initiative and referendum. Those powers operate alongside the Legislature’s constitutional authority.
2. Proposition 4 exposed a fundamental constitutional conflict.
Following voters’ approval of the 2018 redistricting initiative, the Legislature substantially changed its framework. In 2024, the Utah Supreme Court recognized enforceable protections for qualifying citizen-enacted government reforms, establishing limits on legislative changes that impair the people’s constitutional right to reform their government.
3. Amendment D failed constitutional requirements.
Courts found that the 2024 amendment’s ballot description inadequately disclosed its central effect and that constitutionally required newspaper publication had not occurred. The amendment could not take effect. These findings did not, by themselves, establish deliberate deception or misconduct by individual legislators.
4. Amendment A would change constitutional public-notice protections.
Amendment A would replace the Constitution’s newspaper-publication requirement with publication for at least 60 days in a manner established by statute.
Although modernization may improve accessibility, the proposal would transfer control over the publication method from a constitutional requirement to ordinary legislation. The separate requirement for an accurate ballot description would remain.
The central question is whether public-notice procedures can be modernized while preserving sufficiently independent and enforceable constitutional safeguards.
5. Amendment B would impose a higher threshold on specified citizen tax initiatives.
Amendment B would require at least 60% voter approval for certain statewide citizen-initiated tax measures, while ordinary legislative taxmaking would remain subject to existing legislative voting rules.
This raises two questions:
- What documented problem demonstrates that the existing citizen-initiative process requires this additional constitutional restriction?
- Why should citizens face a higher approval threshold for specified tax measures than legislators face under ordinary legislative procedures?
6. The broader historical record reveals recurring disputes over citizen participation.
Proposition 4, Amendment D, SB54, the 2020 tax-reform referendum, and other legislative controversies illustrate continuing disagreements over the distribution of political authority.
The Republic Project has initiated a separate investigation of Utah election-related legislation from 2014 through 2026 to examine changes in initiative, referendum, petition, and election procedures.
7. Political influence and financial relationships warrant scrutiny.
The investigation identifies legislators, political committees, advocacy organizations, contributors, and institutional relationships associated with these constitutional disputes.
These activities are legitimate subjects of public examination. However, political contributions, alliances, and shared policy objectives do not, by themselves, establish corruption, improper coordination, or conspiracy.
Financial information not yet reconciled with original filings is treated as an investigative lead rather than a verified finding.
The Central Constitutional Question
Amendments A and B address different subjects, but both concern the rules governing the exercise or protection of constitutional authority.
Amendment A would place the method of publishing proposed constitutional amendments under statutory control. Amendment B would require a higher voter-approval threshold for specified citizen-initiated tax measures.
Supporters describe these proposals as modernization and taxpayer protection. Critics question their consequences for constitutional safeguards and citizen participation.
The investigation examines both the stated purposes and practical effects of these changes.
When the rules governing citizen participation are changed, who gains authority, who loses it, and what safeguards remain to protect the constitutional balance?
That is the central question behind The Story Behind the Amendments.
The following report presents the historical record, constitutional analysis, political relationships, supporting documentation, and unresolved questions for public examination, including the following:
The Conflict That Started With Proposition 4
The Next Chapter: Amendments A and B
The Unanswered Question Behind Amendment B
The People Behind the Proposals
The Money, the Messaging, and the Public Record
The Oath of Office and Constitutional Accountability
Is There a Deep State in Utah?
The Question Utahns Must Answer
The Questions Voters Will See on Their Ballots
Section 1: The Constitutional Foundation
The Government Belongs to the People, Not the Other Way Around
There is a principle at the heart of the Utah Constitution that every citizen should understand and every elected official should remember: The people created the government. The government did not create the people. It is a simple distinction, but one with enormous consequences when the institutions of government begin disagreeing with the citizens whose authority they exercise. For nearly eight years, Utah has been engaged in just such a disagreement, one that began with a voter-approved redistricting initiative and eventually reached the state’s highest court. What appeared at first to be a political dispute over election boundaries became something considerably more important: a constitutional confrontation over who holds the power to reform government, and how far elected representatives may go when they disagree with reforms adopted by the people themselves.
The answer begins with Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution:
“All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit.”
Those words are not merely an inspirational introduction to the machinery of government. They establish its source of authority. Utah’s elected officials possess substantial powers, including the ability to enact laws, levy taxes, establish budgets, and make decisions affecting millions of citizens. But those powers are delegated and limited. Legislators do not acquire sovereignty by winning an election, nor does a legislative majority possess unlimited authority simply because it can assemble enough votes to pass a bill. The Legislature operates within a Constitution that derives its legitimacy from the people and establishes boundaries that government must respect.
The distinction becomes especially important when citizens decide to exercise powers they never surrendered to their representatives. Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution reserves to the people the authority to propose and enact laws through initiatives and to exercise the power of referendum. These are not favors granted by legislative permission. They are constitutional powers that allow Utahns to act directly when they believe their government should pursue a different course. The initiative process can be cumbersome, expensive, and politically contentious, but its existence reflects a deliberate constitutional judgment: representative government should not possess a monopoly over the making of laws.
That principle was tested in November 2018, when Utah voters approved Proposition 4, an initiative intended to reduce partisan manipulation of political district boundaries. The measure created an independent redistricting commission and established standards designed to constrain the drawing of election maps for political advantage. Its margin of victory was narrow, approximately 50.3%, but that did not diminish its legal significance. Under the rules governing an ordinary statewide initiative, a lawful majority was enough. The people had exercised a constitutional power and enacted a government reform.
The Legislature responded in 2020 by passing Senate Bill 200, which repealed and replaced Proposition 4’s statutory framework. Although an independent commission remained, important safeguards were altered or eliminated, including restrictions on partisan gerrymandering and requirements governing the Legislature’s treatment of commission recommendations. Lawmakers defended their authority to revise legislation, maintaining that laws enacted by initiative remained statutes and therefore could be amended or repealed through the ordinary legislative process. Opponents argued that this interpretation would permit elected officials to dismantle the very reforms citizens had enacted to restrain those officials. If the Legislature could remove the central protections of a government-reform initiative whenever it disagreed with them, what practical protection did the people’s constitutional right to reform government actually provide?
That question eventually reached the Utah Supreme Court. On July 11, 2024, in League of Women Voters of Utah v. Utah State Legislature, 2024 UT 21, the court issued a unanimous decision recognizing that Article I, Section 2 protects the people’s right to alter or reform their government, and that the initiative process provides a means of exercising that right. The court concluded that the Legislature’s ordinary lawmaking authority does not give it unrestricted power to impair qualifying government reforms enacted by voters.
The decision did not make every citizen initiative permanent or immune from revision. That distinction is essential. Lawmakers may make changes that support a government reform or do not impair it. Even changes that impair a protected reform may be permissible when narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. The court also did not finally decide every issue concerning the challenged redistricting legislation and maps in its July 2024 ruling. It returned the case for further proceedings under the constitutional standard it had established. Nevertheless, the decision drew a consequential boundary: The Legislature’s authority to enact laws does not supersede the people’s constitutional right to reform their government.
For legislative leaders who believed that voter-enacted statutes should remain subject to the same broad legislative revision as other laws, the ruling presented a serious institutional problem. The Supreme Court had interpreted the Constitution in a manner that restricted legislative discretion over certain initiatives. Lawmakers could continue defending their position through the judicial process, or they could ask voters to change the Constitution itself. Within weeks, they pursued the second option.
That decision brought another constitutional safeguard into the controversy. Article XXIII establishes the procedures through which Utah’s Constitution may be amended. A proposed legislative amendment must receive the required two-thirds approval in each chamber before being submitted to voters. At the time of the 2024 dispute, the Constitution also required proposed amendments to be published in newspapers for two months before the general election. These procedures exist because changing a constitution is fundamentally different from passing an ordinary statute. A constitutional amendment can alter the distribution of governmental authority, redefine rights, and change the rules that future legislatures must obey. The additional requirements are intended to ensure that such changes are undertaken deliberately and with the public properly informed.
In August 2024, legislative leaders advanced Amendment D, a proposal that would have expanded the Legislature’s authority to amend or repeal citizen-enacted laws, including the government reforms protected by the Supreme Court’s recent decision. Its supporters argued that the court had disrupted the traditional relationship between representative government and direct democracy. Its opponents argued that the proposal would weaken the people’s ability to restrain their own government. Both sides recognized that the amendment concerned something larger than redistricting: it would determine the constitutional balance of power between the Legislature and the people, particularly when citizens use their initiative authority to impose restraints upon their elected representatives.
Section 2: Proposition 4, The Vote That Started the Constitutional Confrontation
When the People Decided to Change the Rules
In November 2018, Utah voters exercised one of the most important powers reserved to them by their state Constitution. They decided to change the way their government draws political boundaries, a process that can determine which candidates win elections, which communities have meaningful representation, and which political interests retain influence for years. By a narrow majority of approximately 50.3%, voters approved Proposition 4, commonly known as Better Boundaries, an initiative intended to reduce partisan manipulation of legislative and congressional districts. The margin was close, but the result was legally sufficient. Utahns had used their constitutional initiative power to enact a government reform, and the reform was intended to place meaningful restrictions on the politicians responsible for drawing election maps.
To understand why this vote became so consequential, it is necessary to understand what redistricting actually does. Every ten years, following the federal census, states redraw political boundaries to account for population changes. The process is necessary, but the authority to draw those boundaries also creates opportunities for political advantage. By dividing communities, combining favorable voting populations, or concentrating opposing voters within particular districts, those controlling the process can influence electoral outcomes without changing a single vote. This practice, commonly known as gerrymandering, has been controversial throughout American political history because it raises a fundamental question of representative government: Should voters choose their representatives, or should representatives be permitted to shape the electorate that chooses them?
Proposition 4 attempted to address that problem by establishing an independent redistricting commission and adopting standards intended to limit partisan manipulation. The initiative did not eliminate the Legislature’s role in approving political maps. Rather, it sought to make that role more transparent and subject to meaningful standards, reducing the ability of elected officials to draw boundaries primarily for their own political benefit. Supporters regarded the measure as a necessary safeguard against conflicts of interest inherent in allowing politicians to design the districts in which they or their political allies would compete. Opponents questioned whether the initiative’s approach was appropriate or necessary, and some maintained that redistricting decisions should remain principally with elected representatives who could be held accountable by voters.
Those disagreements were legitimate subjects for public debate. But the voters had made their decision through the constitutional process available to them. The next question was whether the Legislature would preserve the essential reforms the people had enacted.
It did not preserve them in their original form.
In 2020, before the next redistricting cycle, Utah lawmakers enacted Senate Bill 200, repealing and replacing Proposition 4’s statutory framework. The replacement legislation retained an independent redistricting commission, but changed important features of the voter-approved system. The commission’s recommendations became advisory, and the Legislature was no longer bound by the same restrictions on partisan gerrymandering that voters had approved. Lawmakers could reject the commission’s proposed maps without being required to provide the explanations contemplated by the original initiative. The result was a substantially different relationship between the commission and the Legislature, one that restored considerable discretion to the very institution Proposition 4 had sought to constrain.
Supporters of Senate Bill 200 defended the changes as an appropriate exercise of legislative authority. They maintained that elected representatives, rather than an independent commission, should retain final responsibility for political district boundaries. From that perspective, the revised framework preserved the benefits of public participation and independent recommendations without surrendering the Legislature’s constitutional role. Critics saw something quite different. They argued that lawmakers had removed central safeguards of a citizen-enacted reform, leaving the commission with an advisory function while restoring the Legislature’s ability to disregard the protections voters had approved.
The dispute was no longer simply about the best way to draw election districts. It had become a test of the initiative power itself. If citizens could undertake the difficult work of qualifying an initiative for the ballot, persuade a majority of voters to approve it, and still see its central protections removed by the Legislature, what practical force did the constitutional right to reform government possess?
That question became more urgent in 2021, when Utah undertook congressional redistricting following the 2020 census. The independent commission developed proposed maps, but the Legislature rejected its recommendations and adopted a different congressional map in November. One of the most controversial features of the legislative plan was its division of Salt Lake County among all four congressional districts. Critics argued that the boundaries diluted the political influence of communities that might otherwise have been able to elect representatives reflecting their preferences. Supporters defended the Legislature’s authority to make the final decision and maintained that its choices reflected legitimate redistricting considerations.
The disagreement soon moved from the political arena into the courts. In 2022, the League of Women Voters of Utah, Mormon Women for Ethical Government, and individual voters challenged the Legislature’s actions. Their lawsuit raised allegations concerning partisan gerrymandering and the Legislature’s repeal and replacement of Proposition 4. The plaintiffs contended that the Legislature had violated constitutional protections by impairing a government reform enacted directly by the people. Legislative defendants maintained that a citizen-enacted initiative remained a statute and, like other statutes, could be revised or repealed through the ordinary legislative process.
The competing arguments exposed a constitutional question with implications far beyond redistricting. Legislatures routinely amend laws as circumstances change. That authority is an essential feature of representative government, and the mere fact that a law originated through an initiative does not automatically place it beyond all legislative revision. But Utah’s Constitution also reserves legislative authority to the people and declares that political power is inherent in them. If an initiative is specifically intended to reform the government, and the officials affected by that reform can eliminate its central protections whenever they disagree with them, the people’s reserved authority may become little more than a temporary permission to legislate.
This was the issue the Utah Supreme Court confronted in July 2024.
On July 11, the court issued a unanimous decision in League of Women Voters of Utah v. Utah State Legislature, 2024 UT 21. It recognized that Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution protects the people’s right to alter or reform their government, and that the initiative power reserved in Article VI provides a means of exercising that right. The court concluded that legislative authority to amend or repeal statutes is subject to constitutional limitations when lawmakers interfere with qualifying government reforms enacted through the initiative process.
The ruling was consequential, but its limits are important. The Supreme Court did not hold that every initiative becomes permanent law or that lawmakers are forbidden from making changes to voter-approved measures. Legislative amendments that support a reform or do not impair it remain permissible. Even changes that impair a protected government reform may survive constitutional review if they are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. Nor did the court decide in July 2024 that Senate Bill 200 was unconstitutional. It returned the case to the district court for further proceedings under the newly articulated standard.
Nevertheless, the constitutional implications were unmistakable. The Legislature’s general lawmaking authority did not permit it to disregard the people’s reserved right to reform their government. For the first time in this litigation, the dispute over Proposition 4 had produced a definitive ruling from Utah’s highest court concerning the constitutional relationship between citizen initiatives and legislative power.
Within weeks, legislative leaders responded to the July 2024 ruling by proposing Amendment D during an August special session. The proposal sought to change the constitutional rules governing legislative authority over citizen-enacted government reforms. Although lawmakers possessed the lawful authority to propose such an amendment, its substance and the procedures used to present it to voters generated a second constitutional controversy.
In October 2024, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the invalidation of Amendment D on two independent grounds: an inadequate ballot description and failure to satisfy the Constitution’s newspaper-publication requirement. The amendment did not take effect.
These developments are examined in detail in Section 3. Their significance here is that the dispute over Proposition 4 had expanded beyond redistricting into a broader contest over the constitutional boundaries of legislative power.
Meanwhile, the original redistricting lawsuit continued.
On August 25, 2025, the district court applied the constitutional standard established by the Supreme Court and ruled that the Legislature’s repeal and replacement of Proposition 4 violated the Utah Constitution. The court concluded that Senate Bill 200 had impaired the government reforms enacted by voters and that the Legislature had not demonstrated the compelling governmental interest necessary to justify that impairment. It also invalidated the congressional map adopted under the replacement framework.
The distinction between the two judicial decisions matters. In July 2024, the Supreme Court established the governing constitutional standard. In August 2025, the district court applied that standard to the Legislature’s actions and found them unconstitutional. The legal process did not end there. Legislative defendants continued pursuing judicial review, and disputes over the congressional boundaries to be used in future elections continued.
In November 2025, the district court rejected a replacement map adopted by the Legislature and selected a different congressional map for the 2026 elections. Further appeals and procedural disagreements followed. Nearly eight years after the original Proposition 4 vote, Utah’s redistricting controversy remained entangled in litigation, constitutional interpretation, and competing claims about the proper authority of elected representatives.
The documented sequence is remarkable. Citizens approved a government reform. The Legislature repealed and replaced important parts of it. The Legislature then adopted political boundaries under the replacement framework. Citizens challenged those actions. The Utah Supreme Court recognized constitutional protections for voter-enacted government reforms. Legislative leaders proposed Amendment D to change the constitutional balance, but the courts prevented that amendment from taking effect because its submission failed constitutional requirements. The district court subsequently ruled that the Legislature’s replacement of Proposition 4 violated the Constitution.
Those events establish a sustained institutional conflict. They do not, by themselves, establish that every legislator shared the same motive, that the actions were directed by a concealed political organization, or that the officials involved knowingly violated their oaths of office. Such conclusions would require evidence beyond the chronology of legislative votes and judicial decisions. But the record does establish that the Legislature repeatedly defended and sought to preserve authority over a government-reform initiative enacted by the people, even as the courts recognized and enforced constitutional limitations on that authority.
That history provides essential context for understanding Amendments A and B, although the distinctions among the proposals must be preserved.
Amendment A concerns the publication procedures for proposed constitutional amendments. It would replace the constitutional requirement for newspaper publication with a requirement for at least 60 days of notice through methods established by statute. That change is relevant because the newspaper-publication requirement was one of the safeguards enforced against Amendment D. Amendment B concerns a different constitutional power: it would require 60% voter approval for certain citizen-initiated tax measures. Neither amendment directly repeals Proposition 4, and neither accomplishes the same broad change to initiative authority that Amendment D sought.
Nevertheless, the timing and institutional context warrant examination. The Legislature had experienced judicial limits on its authority over citizen-enacted government reforms. It had attempted to change those limits through Amendment D. It subsequently proposed changes affecting the constitutional procedures through which amendments are published and the approval threshold applicable to specified citizen initiatives. Whether those proposals reflect independent policy judgments, a shared constitutional philosophy, or a more coordinated strategy is a question for the evidence, not an assumption to be imposed upon it.
Subsequent Judicial Proceedings, 2025–2026
The litigation surrounding Proposition 4 continued after the Utah Supreme Court’s landmark 2024 decision. On September 15, 2025, in State Legislature v. League of Women Voters, 2025 UT 39, the Utah Supreme Court denied the Legislature’s emergency request concerning the injunction against the 2021 congressional map. Although the court discussed the district court’s August 2025 ruling, it did not undertake a full review of that ruling’s merits.
On February 20, 2026, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed a subsequent legislative appeal concerning the August 2025 ruling on jurisdictional grounds. That dismissal did not constitute a new substantive decision affirming every aspect of the district court’s reasoning.
These proceedings illustrate an important distinction: a court’s decision to deny emergency relief or dismiss an appeal for jurisdictional reasons is not necessarily a final determination of every constitutional issue underlying the dispute. The legal significance of each ruling must be understood in light of what the court actually decided.
The central fact remains that Proposition 4 began with citizens attempting to restrain the political discretion of their elected representatives. What followed was a prolonged struggle over whether those representatives could remove the restraints the people had imposed.
The confrontation reached a turning point in July 2024, when the Utah Supreme Court recognized constitutional limits on legislative interference with certain voter-enacted government reforms. Rather than accept that interpretation as the final word, legislative leaders pursued another lawful avenue: asking voters to change the Constitution itself.
Their proposal, Amendment D, would become the next major test of where legislative authority ends and the people’s reserved constitutional power begins.
Section 3: Amendment D, The Attempt to Rewrite the Rules
When the Court Said No, the Legislature Turned to the Constitution
On July 11, 2024, the Utah Supreme Court delivered a decision that would fundamentally change the legal battle over Proposition 4. After years of litigation, the court recognized constitutional protections for the people’s right to reform their government through citizen initiatives. The ruling did not eliminate the Legislature’s authority to amend laws, but it established that lawmakers could not freely dismantle qualifying government reforms enacted by voters. For legislative leaders who had defended their authority to replace Proposition 4, the decision represented a significant restriction on institutional power.
The Legislature’s response to the July 2024 ruling took the form of Amendment D, proposed during a special legislative session approximately six weeks after the decision. The proposal sought to change the constitutional rules the Supreme Court had just interpreted and enforced.
The significance of that response lies not merely in its speed, but in what lawmakers sought to change: the constitutional relationship between the people’s initiative authority and the Legislature’s power to alter citizen-enacted reforms.
The Legislature was no longer merely defending its earlier decisions under the existing Constitution. It was asking voters to change the Constitution itself so that lawmakers would possess broader authority over citizen-enacted laws, including reforms intended to restrain government.
That distinction is essential to understanding what followed. The Legislature possessed the constitutional authority to propose an amendment. Utah’s Constitution expressly provides a process for doing so. But the circumstances raised an extraordinary question: When the courts enforce a constitutional limitation on government power, should the officials subject to that limitation be permitted to ask the people to remove it? The legal answer is yes, provided they follow the required procedures. Whether such a change would serve the public interest is a different question, one that belongs to the voters.
What Amendment D Would Have Changed
Amendment D contained several provisions. It addressed foreign influence in Utah’s initiative and referendum processes, identified methods through which citizens could exercise their constitutional right to alter or reform government, and included provisions relating to the referendum process. Those subjects were not imaginary distractions. They were part of the proposed amendment and could be evaluated on their own merits. But the provision at the center of the controversy concerned legislative authority. Amendment D would have removed the constitutional restrictions recognized by the Supreme Court, permitting the Legislature to amend or repeal citizen-enacted government reforms without satisfying the demanding standard established in the July ruling.
Supporters argued that the Supreme Court had departed from the traditional relationship between representative government and direct democracy. In their view, elected legislators needed the ability to revise laws as circumstances changed, regardless of whether those laws originated through the Legislature or a citizen initiative. They maintained that allowing some initiatives to receive heightened constitutional protection could make government less responsive and create uncertainty about the Legislature’s responsibility to govern.
Opponents viewed the proposal through an entirely different lens. They argued that the people’s reserved initiative power would lose much of its effectiveness if elected officials could remove reforms specifically designed to limit those officials’ authority. Proposition 4 provided a concrete example. Citizens had approved restrictions on partisan redistricting, and the Legislature had replaced important parts of those restrictions. The Supreme Court had recognized a constitutional limit on that practice. Amendment D would have removed that limit.
The disagreement was therefore not merely about which branch of government should make better policy decisions. It concerned whether citizens could use their constitutional authority to establish meaningful restraints on the government they had created.
The Official Explanation and the People Who Wrote It
On August 19, 2024, Senate President Stuart Adams and House Speaker Mike Schultz publicly announced the special session. Their explanation emphasized the need to restore what they considered the proper balance of legislative and citizen authority following the Supreme Court’s decision. The announcement also highlighted the amendment’s provisions concerning foreign influence and the referendum process.
Those arguments were part of the public record, and the sponsors were entitled to make them. But the government’s official ballot description carried a different responsibility. Unlike a political speech or campaign advertisement, official ballot language is intended to tell voters what a proposed constitutional amendment would accomplish. It must accurately communicate material changes so that citizens can make an informed decision.
Earlier in 2024, the Legislature had changed state law to assign responsibility for drafting constitutional amendment ballot titles to the presiding officers of the House and Senate. That placed the preparation of Amendment D’s official description in the hands of legislative leadership, including Adams and Schultz.
The resulting ballot language presented Amendment D as strengthening the initiative process and clarifying the authority of voters and legislative bodies. It described some of the proposal’s additional provisions, but it did not adequately explain the central consequence identified by opponents: approval would eliminate constitutional restrictions on legislative authority to amend or repeal government reforms enacted through citizen initiatives.
That omission became the foundation of a legal challenge.
The problem was not simply that opponents disliked the wording or believed the amendment would produce undesirable results. Political disagreement over ballot language is common. The constitutional issue was whether the government’s official description accurately disclosed a material change in the allocation of power between citizens and the Legislature.
For voters who had followed the Proposition 4 controversy, the significance might have been apparent. But a constitutional ballot description cannot assume that every citizen has read years of litigation or understands the legal consequences of a Supreme Court decision. The purpose of official ballot language is to communicate the essential nature of the proposed change to voters who may know little about its history.
On that point, the courts found Amendment D deficient.
The Publication Requirement the Legislature Failed to Meet
Amendment D faced another constitutional problem, one that initially appeared to concern a technical publication procedure but would later become directly relevant to Amendment A.
Article XXIII of the Utah Constitution required proposed constitutional amendments to be published in newspapers for two months before the election. This requirement was intended to provide advance public notice of proposed changes to the state’s fundamental governing document. It was not merely a statutory preference that lawmakers could disregard through ordinary legislation.
The history of the publication failure is particularly important.
In 2023, the Legislature changed Utah’s statutory publication procedures, removing the statutory instruction requiring the lieutenant governor to publish proposed constitutional amendments in newspapers. The revised framework relied on alternative public-notice procedures. But the Constitution itself had not been amended to eliminate its newspaper-publication requirement.
That created a conflict between what ordinary state law directed officials to do and what the Constitution continued to require.
When Amendment D was proposed in 2024, officials relied on the statutory publication framework rather than completing the newspaper publication required by Article XXIII. The proposed amendment was publicized through other channels, and the controversy received considerable media attention. Nevertheless, the constitutional publication requirement remained in force.
The distinction may appear technical, but its importance is fundamental. A Legislature cannot eliminate a constitutional requirement simply by changing the statute that implements it. The Constitution is superior to ordinary legislation. If lawmakers believe a constitutional procedure has become outdated, they may propose changing it through the amendment process. Until that change is lawfully adopted, the existing requirement remains binding.
This is precisely the issue the Supreme Court was required to address.
Two Separate Constitutional Failures
In October 2024, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the determination that Amendment D had not been properly submitted to voters. Its opinion identified two independent constitutional defects.
The first concerned the official ballot description. The court concluded that the language failed to adequately disclose the amendment’s effect on the Legislature’s authority over citizen-enacted government reforms. The description did not sufficiently inform voters that the proposal would remove constitutional restrictions recognized in the July 2024 decision.
The second concerned publication. The required newspaper publication had not occurred, and the Legislature’s alternative statutory procedures did not satisfy the Constitution’s express requirement.
These were separate failures. Either one was sufficient to prevent the amendment from taking effect through the submission process used in 2024.
The court did not rule that the Legislature was forbidden from proposing an amendment to change initiative power. Nor did it decide that voters could never approve such a proposal. Its ruling concerned the constitutional requirements governing how an amendment must be submitted to the electorate.
But that distinction does not diminish the seriousness of the findings. The Legislature had sought to change the constitutional balance between citizens and government, yet the process used to present that change failed to comply with the Constitution. The official explanation was inadequate, and a required form of public notice had not been provided.
The consequences were immediate. Amendment D remained on the printed ballot, but votes cast on the proposal were not counted toward its adoption. The constitutional change did not take effect.
The episode demonstrated something important about Utah’s system of checks and balances. The Legislature could propose changes to the Constitution, but it could not unilaterally decide that its own procedures were sufficient when those procedures conflicted with constitutional requirements. The courts retained the authority to enforce those requirements, even against a proposal supported by legislative leadership.
The Political Response and the Question of Responsibility
The failure of Amendment D produced substantial political controversy. Supporters criticized the judicial decisions and defended their efforts to restore legislative authority. Opponents viewed the rulings as necessary protections against an attempt to weaken citizen initiative rights. Legislative leaders subsequently acknowledged mistakes in the amendment process while continuing to dispute the Supreme Court’s broader interpretation of initiative power.
There is an important distinction between acknowledging a procedural failure and accepting the constitutional philosophy underlying a court decision. Officials may concede that a ballot description was inadequate or that publication requirements were not satisfied while maintaining that the proposed amendment itself would have been good public policy. That position is not inherently improper. Constitutional government permits lawmakers to disagree with judicial interpretations and seek lawful changes.
The political reaction to Utah’s redistricting litigation also exposed a troubling question about respect for judicial authority. Critics of the court’s decisions portrayed judicial intervention as an improper intrusion into legislative power, while some political rhetoric went further by challenging the legitimacy of the rulings themselves. There is, however, a fundamental constitutional distinction between arguing that a judge reached an incorrect legal conclusion and alleging that the judge acted illegally. The former is a legitimate subject of public debate and appellate review; the latter requires evidence of unlawful conduct. Judicial independence does not place judges above criticism, but neither does legislative authority place lawmakers beyond judicial review. When political leaders blur these distinctions, the resulting controversy can undermine public understanding of the separation of powers at the very moment those constitutional safeguards are being tested.
But the events also raise legitimate questions about accountability.
Who was responsible for ensuring that the official ballot description accurately explained the amendment’s effect? Who determined that the statutory publication process was sufficient despite the Constitution’s newspaper requirement? What legal advice was provided, and when? Were concerns raised before the proposal was submitted? If so, how were they addressed?
Those questions are not answered simply by identifying the officials who supported Amendment D. Legislative votes, drafting responsibilities, legal advice, and administrative implementation involve different duties. A complete investigation must distinguish among them.
The court’s findings establish constitutional failures in the submission process. They do not establish that every legislator who voted for Amendment D knowingly violated the Constitution or deliberately sought to deceive voters. Such allegations would require additional evidence concerning individual knowledge, intent, and conduct.
Nevertheless, the responsibility to comply with constitutional safeguards belongs to government officials, not to the citizens who must rely on them. When lawmakers propose changing the fundamental rules of government, the public is entitled to expect particular care in following the existing rules.
The Connection to Amendment A
The importance of Amendment D did not end when the proposal failed.
In 2025, the Legislature approved a new constitutional proposal that would become Amendment A on the November 2026 ballot. Unlike Amendment D, Amendment A does not seek to restore broad legislative authority over citizen-enacted government reforms. Its subject is the publication requirement for proposed constitutional amendments.
But its relationship to the Amendment D litigation is direct and documented.
Amendment A would replace the Constitution’s specific newspaper-publication requirement with a minimum 60-day notice period using a method prescribed by statute. Supporters present this as modernization. The larger question, examined in the next section, is whether the change also shifts meaningful control over a constitutional safeguard from the people to the Legislature.
The constitutional question, however, extends beyond how public notices are delivered. It concerns who has the authority to establish and change the rules governing those notices.
Under the existing system, the publication method is specified in the Constitution. Changing that method requires constitutional amendment. Under Amendment A, the Legislature would acquire greater authority to determine the method through ordinary legislation, subject to the remaining constitutional requirements.
The difference is significant because the Legislature had already changed the statutory publication process in 2023, encountered a constitutional obstacle when using that process for Amendment D in 2024, and then proposed changing the constitutional publication requirement in 2025.
That chronology does not establish that Amendment A was conceived as part of a concealed strategy. Nor does it prove that its sponsors acted improperly. It does establish that Amendment A addresses the precise category of constitutional requirement that the courts enforced against Amendment D.
One further distinction is essential. Even if Amendment A’s proposed publication rules had governed in 2024, changing the newspaper requirement alone would not have resolved Amendment D’s other constitutional defect. The misleading ballot-description problem would have remained.
Amendment A therefore should not be described as a measure that would necessarily have saved Amendment D. It would change one of the safeguards involved in that case, not eliminate every requirement governing the lawful submission of constitutional amendments.
The question for voters is whether the proposed modernization provides sufficient public notice while preserving appropriate restraints on the Legislature’s ability to alter the procedures governing future constitutional changes.
The Larger Constitutional Question
Amendment D represents a pivotal moment in Utah’s recent political history because it exposed a fundamental disagreement about the relationship between representative government and the people’s reserved constitutional authority.
The Legislature had altered a government reform approved through Proposition 4. The Supreme Court recognized limits on that authority. Legislative leaders responded by asking voters to change the Constitution so that lawmakers would possess broader discretion. The courts then found that the proposal had not been properly submitted because its official description was inadequate and the required publication had not occurred.
Every major step is documented. The underlying political motives, however, require more careful examination.
Supporters of Amendment D believed the Supreme Court had restricted legislative authority too severely. Opponents believed the amendment would undermine the people’s constitutional ability to reform government. Those competing positions reflect a serious disagreement over constitutional structure, not necessarily evidence of unlawful conduct.
But the events also reveal why constitutional safeguards matter. When elected officials seek to change the rules that limit their own authority, citizens need accurate information and reliable procedures. The public must be able to distinguish between a proposal’s advertised benefits and its actual legal consequences.
The failure of Amendment D did not end the dispute over initiative power. Legislative leaders continued publicly challenging the court’s interpretation, and later proposals addressed other aspects of the constitutional relationship between citizens and government.
Amendment A would change how proposed constitutional amendments are published. Amendment B would establish a higher approval threshold for certain citizen-initiated tax measures. Their purposes and effects are different, and neither should be treated as a direct substitute for Amendment D. But both arise against the background of a continuing struggle over who controls the procedures and powers through which Utahns govern themselves.
The central lesson of Amendment D is not that constitutional change is illegitimate. It is that the authority to change the Constitution carries an obligation to respect the Constitution being changed.
Utah’s voters have the final authority to approve or reject properly submitted amendments. To exercise that authority meaningfully, they must understand what they are being asked to change, why the change is proposed, and which constitutional safeguards will remain.
That brings the investigation to Amendment A, the proposal that would replace Utah’s longstanding constitutional newspaper-publication requirement with a method determined by ordinary legislation.
Section 4: Amendment A, Modernizing Public Notice or Changing a Constitutional Safeguard?
The Requirement That Stopped Amendment D
The history of Amendment D provides an important foundation for understanding the next constitutional question facing Utah voters. Although the courts prevented Amendment D from taking effect because of failures in the amendment process, one of those failures concerned a longstanding requirement that proposed constitutional amendments be published in newspapers before an election. That requirement, established in the Utah Constitution itself, could not be displaced by the Legislature’s earlier changes to ordinary state law.
The distinction between constitutional and statutory authority is central to Amendment A. The Legislature possesses broad authority to establish procedures through legislation, but that authority remains subject to the Constitution. When the Constitution specifies a particular safeguard, lawmakers cannot replace it merely by adopting a different statutory procedure. They must first obtain the voters’ approval to amend the governing constitutional provision.
Amendment A would ask voters to authorize precisely that change. Its immediate subject is the modernization of public notice, but its constitutional significance extends to the authority future legislatures would possess over the method by which proposed amendments are brought to the public’s attention.
A New Amendment With an Old Connection
Amendment A asks Utah voters to decide more than whether newspapers should remain the required means of publishing proposed constitutional amendments. It raises a broader constitutional question: Should the Constitution itself continue specifying the publication method, or should that responsibility be transferred to ordinary state law?
During the 2025 legislative session, Representative Anthony Loubet and Senator Daniel McCay sponsored House Joint Resolution 10, which proposed replacing the Constitution’s newspaper-publication requirement with a minimum 60-day publication period using a method prescribed by statute. Companion legislation, House Bill 481, established an electronic-publication framework involving the Utah Public Notice Website and the lieutenant governor’s website.
The modernization argument is substantial. Newspapers no longer serve as the principal source of information for many Utahns. Electronic publication can make proposed amendments more accessible, reduce publication costs, and provide a searchable public record. Amendment A would not eliminate the requirement to provide public notice. The proposed constitutional language would retain a minimum publication period of 60 calendar days.
The constitutional significance, however, extends beyond modernization. The newspaper-publication requirement was one of the independent grounds on which Amendment D failed in 2024. Under the existing constitutional framework, the Legislature cannot eliminate that specified publication method through ordinary legislation. Under Amendment A, future legislatures would have greater authority to change the publication method by statute, without asking voters to approve another constitutional amendment.
That distinction is the heart of the issue. The question is not simply how the public receives notice. It is who controls the rules governing that notice, and what constitutional restraints remain on that authority.
Who Should Control the Safeguards?
The deeper issue is not whether newspapers are better than websites. It is whether the rules governing the publication of proposed constitutional amendments should remain fixed in the Constitution or be left to lawmakers to define through statute.
A constitutional requirement has a special character. The Legislature cannot change it by passing an ordinary bill. Altering it requires the more demanding amendment process, including approval by voters. A statutory requirement is different. Once the Constitution delegates the publication method to statute, future legislatures can change that method through the ordinary legislative process without seeking another constitutional amendment.
That is the institutional shift Amendment A would make. It would move an important procedural detail from the Constitution into a body of law controlled by the Legislature, while preserving the constitutional minimum publication period. Supporters see flexibility and modernization. Critics see the potential weakening of an independently fixed safeguard, particularly when the same institution responsible for proposing amendments would also control the statutory rules governing their publication.
The history of Amendment D makes this more than an abstract constitutional question. In 2024, the Supreme Court enforced a newspaper-publication requirement against the Legislature. In 2025, lawmakers proposed replacing that constitutional requirement with a method prescribed by statute. The chronological connection is undeniable, and the legislative history should be examined to determine how directly the Amendment D experience influenced the proposal.
But chronology alone does not prove an improper motive. A publication rule can be outdated even when it has recently served an important constitutional purpose. Lawmakers can legitimately seek to modernize it. The investigative question is whether the public explanations fully account for the proposal’s consequences, particularly the transfer of control over the publication method.
An Unusual Degree of Agreement
One of the more interesting features of Amendment A is the breadth of its legislative support. House Joint Resolution 10 passed the Utah House by a vote of 70–0 and the Senate by 29–0. Those margins are significant in a political environment where disputes over citizen initiatives and constitutional authority have produced unusually sharp disagreements. The overwhelming support suggests that lawmakers across the political spectrum found the modernization argument persuasive, or at least did not regard the proposed change as sufficiently objectionable to oppose.
That agreement deserves attention because it complicates any attempt to portray Amendment A as simply another partisan confrontation. Legislators who disagreed over Proposition 4 or Amendment D could nevertheless agree that newspaper publication should no longer be the only constitutionally prescribed method for notifying voters about proposed amendments. An amendment may arise in response to a controversial court ruling and still address a genuine administrative problem. The existence of a political connection does not eliminate the possibility of a legitimate policy justification.
But unanimous legislative approval does not settle the constitutional question. The Legislature is the institution that would gain authority to establish and revise the publication method through statute. Citizens are entitled to examine that transfer of authority independently of how many lawmakers supported it. An amendment can be popular within the Legislature while still presenting important questions about the balance between legislative discretion and constitutional safeguards.
The companion legislation, House Bill 481, is therefore an essential part of the analysis. The practical consequences of Amendment A cannot be understood solely by reading the proposed constitutional language. Voters should also examine the statutory publication system intended to operate if the amendment is approved, including where notices would appear, how citizens would find them, and what requirements would prevent future legislatures from making public notice less accessible.
Modernization, Accountability, and the Constitutional Boundary
The significance of Amendment A lies in the distinction between changing an outdated method of public notice and changing the constitutional authority that governs that method. The Legislature’s experience with Amendment D demonstrates why the distinction matters. A publication requirement fixed in the Constitution operates independently of ordinary legislation, while a publication method established by statute can be revised by future legislatures without another statewide constitutional vote. Amendment A would preserve the minimum publication period while changing the legal foundation of the method used to satisfy it.
The legislative chronology is documented. It is not proof that Amendment A’s sponsors intended to undermine constitutional protections. It does, however, establish why the proposal deserves more scrutiny than a routine update to government communications.
The essential issue is whether public notice should be governed by a constitutional instruction that the Legislature cannot change on its own, or by a statutory system that lawmakers can revise without returning to the voters. Amendment A would preserve a minimum publication period while transferring control over the method. Whether that arrangement improves public access or weakens an independent safeguard depends partly on the effectiveness of the statutory system and the protections retained against inadequate notice.
One limitation must remain clear. Amendment D failed for two independent reasons: inadequate official ballot language and failure to satisfy the newspaper-publication requirement. Amendment A addresses the latter. It does not remove the government’s obligation to describe proposed constitutional changes accurately. Even under the publication system contemplated by Amendment A, an official ballot description that materially misleads voters would remain a serious constitutional concern.
Ultimately, Amendment A presents a choice about the architecture of constitutional accountability. Its supporters offer a practical argument for modernizing public notice. Its critics question whether an institution proposing constitutional amendments should also control more of the procedures used to publicize them. Both arguments deserve examination without reducing the proposal to either a harmless technical adjustment or a proven attempt to evade judicial oversight.
The Alternative That Preserves the Safeguard
Modernizing public notice does not necessarily require transferring control of the publication method entirely to the Legislature. Utah could preserve a constitutionally guaranteed, independently verifiable notice requirement while authorizing additional methods of distribution.
Possible approaches include retaining newspaper publication alongside official digital notices, establishing technology-neutral constitutional standards, requiring permanent public archives, providing direct electronic notification to registered voters who request it, and assigning oversight of compliance to an institution independent of the amendment’s sponsors.
Each alternative would require examination for cost, accessibility, administrative feasibility, and legal enforceability. None should be presumed superior without that analysis.
What the Alternatives Reveal About Amendment A
The existence of alternatives changes the central question. Voters are not necessarily choosing between outdated newspaper requirements and modern communication. They are deciding whether modernization requires removing a publication safeguard from the Constitution and placing its implementation under ordinary legislative control.
Amendment A preserves the constitutional notice period while changing who determines the publication method. The distinction matters because the same practical objective, reaching voters through contemporary communication channels, might be achieved through arrangements that retain more independent constitutional protection.
The question, therefore, is not whether public notice should be modernized. It is which institution should possess the authority to change the rules governing that notice.
The question is not simply how Utah should publish constitutional amendments. It is how the people can be assured that future constitutional changes will receive meaningful public notice, regardless of which political interests control the Legislature.
A Broader Legislative History Worth Examining
The history of citizen initiatives and referendums in Utah extends well beyond the constitutional amendments examined in this report. A preliminary review of Utah election-related legislation from 2014 through 2026 identified 284 measures for further examination, including legislation concerning election procedures, initiatives, referendums, and related governmental authority. These measures do not all have the same purpose or effect, and their cumulative consequences require further examination.
Taken together, these developments raise a larger question: How have successive changes to Utah’s election laws affected the practical ability of citizens to exercise the legislative powers reserved to them?
The Republic Project (REPRO) has initiated a separate, in-depth investigation into Utah legislation affecting citizen initiatives, referendums, election procedures, and constitutional safeguards. That investigation will examine individual measures, their legislative histories, and their cumulative legal effects. Its findings will be addressed in a subsequent report.
The 2020 Tax-Reform Referendum: When Citizens Forced a Legislative Reversal
In December 2019, the Utah Legislature approved a controversial tax-restructuring package during a special session. The legislation changed the state’s tax structure, including provisions affecting sales taxes on groceries and certain services. Opponents organized a statewide referendum campaign to challenge the legislation.
By January 2020, petition organizers had gathered sufficient signatures to qualify the referendum for the ballot. Rather than proceed to a statewide vote on the challenged law, the Legislature repealed the tax-reform package.
The referendum therefore never appeared before voters as a decision on whether to retain or reject the legislation. Nevertheless, the petition campaign demonstrated the practical influence of the people’s reserved referendum power. Citizens used a constitutional procedure to challenge legislative action, and the Legislature reversed course before the election occurred.
The episode also illustrates an important distinction between the existence of a constitutional right and the practical conditions under which it can be exercised. Signature requirements, filing deadlines, organizational costs, and procedural restrictions can determine whether citizens can successfully challenge a law before it takes effect.
The 2020 referendum does not establish that subsequent election legislation was designed to weaken citizen authority. It does establish a relevant historical example for examining how Utah’s initiative and referendum procedures have operated when citizens and legislative leaders disagreed over major public policy decisions.
A more recent example comes from Roy, Utah, where residents initially qualified a referendum challenging a proposed 34% municipal property-tax increase. According to FOX 13, the effort, sponsored by Nancy Inman, collected enough verified signatures to place the issue before voters. But subsequent withdrawals reportedly brought the petition below the required threshold, resulting in removal from the ballot. The significance extends beyond the disputed tax increase. The referendum demonstrates that Utah citizens can still exercise their reserved authority to require a public vote on certain decisions made by their elected representatives. Whether voters ultimately approve or reject the increase is a separate question from their right to participate in that decision.
That brings us to Amendment B, where the proposed change is not about how voters learn of constitutional questions, but about how many voters must agree before certain citizen-initiated laws can take effect.
Section 5: Amendment B, Taxpayer Protection or a Higher Barrier for Citizen Initiatives?
A Different Amendment, a Familiar Constitutional Question
If Amendment A raises questions about who controls the rules for changing Utah’s Constitution, Amendment B raises an equally important question about who gets to make laws and under what conditions. This time, the subject is taxation, an issue that touches nearly every household and business in the state. Nobody enjoys paying more taxes, and Utah lawmakers know it. That makes the argument for Amendment B politically attractive: Before the government takes more of your money, shouldn’t a substantial majority of voters agree? It sounds reasonable enough. But the constitutional issue becomes more complicated when we examine whose authority the amendment would restrict and whose authority it would leave unchanged.
During the 2025 legislative session, Senator Lincoln Fillmore, a Republican from South Jordan, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 2, with Representative Jason Kyle of Huntsville serving as the House sponsor. The resolution proposed changing Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, the very provision that reserves legislative authority to the people through the initiative process. Under existing rules, most statewide initiatives become law when approved by a simple majority of voters. Amendment B would require at least 60% approval when a statewide citizen initiative imposes a new tax, extends an existing tax to additional items or transactions, increases an existing tax rate, or changes a property tax rate so that a required reduction is smaller than it otherwise would have been.
The amendment does not apply to every citizen initiative, and it would not retroactively invalidate Proposition 4. It also does not prohibit voters from approving new taxes. Instead, it changes the percentage of support required for certain tax-related initiatives to become law. That may sound like a modest adjustment, but the practical difference can be substantial. Under the existing majority rule, an initiative receiving 55% support ordinarily passes. Under Amendment B, a covered tax initiative receiving that same 55% would fail, even though substantially more voters supported it than opposed it.
The Argument for Protecting Taxpayers
Fillmore and Kyle have framed their proposal as a protection against tax increases approved by narrow majorities. Their argument is that taxation imposes costs on everyone subject to the tax, including those who voted against it. When a citizen initiative seeks to increase those costs, they contend, it should demonstrate broader public support than an ordinary majority. In an October 8, 2026, guest opinion published by the Deseret News, the sponsors argued that tax increases should require substantial agreement among the people who will pay them.
Their position deserves consideration. Tax policy involves difficult tradeoffs, and a proposal that sounds beneficial to one group may impose financial burdens on another. A higher approval threshold could encourage initiative sponsors to develop proposals with wider appeal, explain their financing more carefully, and build broader coalitions before seeking voter approval. Supporters also argue that initiatives differ from ordinary legislation because voters generally must accept or reject a completed proposal rather than participate in the negotiations and amendments that occur during legislative deliberations.
There is another element to the sponsors’ argument: accountability. Legislators who vote to increase taxes can be challenged at the next election. Their decisions become part of a public voting record, and citizens can remove them from office. By contrast, voters who support a citizen initiative cannot be held individually accountable at the ballot box for the resulting tax increase. Fillmore has pointed to that distinction in explaining why he believes citizen-initiated tax measures should face a higher approval requirement.
The Utah Taxpayers Association has also supported Amendment B, emphasizing taxpayer protection and the importance of broader agreement before raising taxes. Its participation is relevant to the investigation because the association is an established political advocacy organization with relationships throughout Utah government. Those relationships, along with its financial involvement in the campaign, will be examined separately in the section dealing with political organizations, contributions, and public messaging.
Where Is the Evidence of the Problem Amendment B Is Intended to Solve?
The sponsors of Amendment B have presented their proposal as a protection against tax increases approved through citizen initiatives. But before Utahns amend their Constitution, a more elementary question deserves an answer:
Where is the evidence of the problem this amendment is intended to solve?
What history of statewide citizen initiatives imposing unwanted tax increases demonstrates that Utah’s existing majority-vote standard is inadequate? Which measures passed by narrow majorities? What financial harm resulted? And why do those examples justify changing the constitutional rules governing the people’s reserved legislative authority?
The argument for Amendment B describes a potential risk. It does not, by itself, establish that the risk has produced a problem requiring constitutional intervention.
That distinction matters. The Constitution should not be amended merely because legislators can imagine a circumstance they would prefer to prevent.
What the Recent Record Shows
The examples examined in this investigation point in a notably different direction.
In 2019, Utah lawmakers enacted a controversial tax-restructuring package. Citizens organized a referendum campaign challenging that legislation. After petition organizers gathered sufficient signatures, the Legislature repealed the package in January 2020.
In that episode, the threatened tax changes originated with elected lawmakers, while citizens used their reserved constitutional power to challenge them.
The example does not prove that citizen-proposed tax increases could never create legitimate concerns. It does, however, complicate the claim that Utah’s most pressing constitutional tax problem is insufficient protection against the voters themselves.
The sponsors of Amendment B should identify the statewide citizen-initiated tax measures that make their proposed 60% requirement necessary. Until those examples are documented and examined, the public is being asked to accept a constitutional solution without a clearly demonstrated history of the problem it purports to solve.
The Roy Case Deserves Attention
The recent dispute in Roy, Utah, offers another instructive example.
As documented elsewhere in this report, residents initially qualified a referendum challenging a proposed 34% municipal property-tax increase. Citizens sought a direct vote on a tax decision made by their local government. But, subsequent signature withdrawals reportedly brought the petition below the required threshold, resulting in removal from the ballot.
This was a municipal referendum challenging government action, not a statewide citizen initiative proposing a tax increase. Consequently, the Roy referendum would not be subject to Amendment B’s proposed 60% approval requirement.
That distinction must be preserved.
Nevertheless, the case illustrates why Utah’s constitutional mechanisms for direct citizen participation matter. Citizens sometimes exercise those powers not to expand government taxation, but to challenge it.
The Roy case therefore raises a question that the taxpayer-protection campaign should not overlook: If the public’s ability to challenge tax decisions is an important safeguard, why should the Constitution make it harder for citizens to exercise direct lawmaking authority in the specified tax categories without a demonstrated need?
An Overlooked Point: Utah Already Regulates Tax Initiatives
Amendment B is not being proposed in a constitutional or statutory vacuum.
Utah already subjects statewide initiatives to procedural requirements, including petition qualification, signature collection, deadlines, ballot procedures, and public-information requirements. These conditions can be substantial obstacles before an initiative ever reaches voters.
The Legislature has also addressed initiative procedures through ordinary legislation, including measures examined elsewhere in this report.
The question is therefore not whether citizen initiatives should be regulated. They already are.
The question is whether the existing safeguards have proved insufficient, and whether adding a 60% voter-approval threshold for specified tax measures is a proportionate response to a documented deficiency.
The sponsors should explain which existing protections fail, provide examples of that failure, and establish why a constitutional supermajority requirement is preferable to narrower statutory reforms.
There is a further inconsistency that deserves scrutiny.
Amendment B would place this additional statewide voting burden on citizens proposing covered tax measures, while leaving the Legislature’s ordinary authority to enact tax legislation under its existing procedures.
Supporters contend that the distinction is justified by representative accountability and the special consequences of taxation. That argument deserves to be heard. But it does not eliminate the need to demonstrate why the people’s direct legislative authority requires this particular restriction.
Before Utahns change their Constitution, they should demand something more substantial than a reassuring slogan.
They should demand evidence.
The Unequal Standard
The central objection to Amendment B is not simply that it makes tax increases harder to approve. It is that the amendment would impose a higher statewide voter-approval requirement on citizen initiatives without imposing an equivalent requirement on ordinary tax legislation passed by elected representatives.
That distinction goes directly to the constitutional relationship examined throughout this report. Article VI, Section 1 places legislative power in both the Legislature and the people, although the two exercise that power through different procedures. Amendment B would create an additional approval condition for certain laws proposed directly by citizens. The Legislature would continue to pass ordinary tax legislation through its established legislative process, without submitting each such measure to a statewide vote requiring 60% approval.
Supporters argue that the distinction is justified because legislators are elected, publicly accountable, and able to revise proposals through hearings, debate, and negotiation.
Opponents respond that the initiative process exists partly because citizens may disagree with their representatives or believe the Legislature has failed to act. They question why the people should face a more demanding approval threshold when exercising their reserved lawmaking authority directly, particularly when elected representatives would retain their ordinary ability to enact tax legislation without obtaining 60% approval in a statewide election.
This difference does not automatically make Amendment B unconstitutional or improper. Constitutions frequently establish different procedures for different forms of governmental action. The question is whether the distinction is justified by the public interests the amendment is intended to protect. Supporters emphasize the financial consequences of taxation and the importance of broader agreement. Opponents emphasize the constitutional status of the initiative power and the danger of making that power substantially harder to exercise in an area where citizens may already be dissatisfied with legislative decisions.
The Practical Meaning of Sixty Percent
The difference between a simple majority and a 60% requirement is not theoretical. Consider a statewide initiative involving a covered tax increase that receives 55% support. Under the ordinary majority standard, it would pass. Under Amendment B, it would fail. The result would be the same even if hundreds of thousands of voters supported the proposal and supporters substantially outnumbered opponents.
That consequence is precisely what supporters intend: a tax increase proposed through the initiative process should not become law without a broader consensus. But it is also the principal concern of opponents, who argue that the amendment would permit a minority exceeding 40% of voters to prevent the majority from enacting certain tax measures directly.
Neither description should be concealed behind campaign slogans. Amendment B would make some citizen-initiated tax measures harder to pass. Whether that is a desirable safeguard or an excessive restriction is the policy judgment voters are being asked to make.
The proposal’s scope also matters. Amendment B would not require 60% approval for every citizen initiative. Its higher threshold would apply to specified categories of tax-related measures, including certain new taxes, tax-rate increases, and expansions of existing taxes. It would not retroactively invalidate Proposition 4, nor would it establish a general 60% requirement for all government-reform initiatives.
These distinctions are essential because the constitutional consequences of an amendment should be judged by its actual language, not by a campaign’s broadest claims about what it might accomplish.
The Historical Context Cannot Be Ignored
Although Amendment B is tax-specific, it arrives during a continuing dispute over the people’s initiative authority. The Legislature’s replacement of Proposition 4, the Supreme Court’s subsequent protection of qualifying government-reform initiatives, and the failed effort to expand legislative authority through Amendment D all form part of the political environment in which Amendment B was proposed.
That history does not establish that Amendment B was designed to overturn the Proposition 4 ruling. It does not. Nor does it prove that its sponsors secretly coordinated the proposal with legislative leadership’s separate efforts to restore broader control over initiatives.
It does, however, justify asking whether Utah is witnessing a series of independent constitutional reforms or a broader legislative preference for placing additional conditions on direct lawmaking by citizens.
Senator Lincoln Fillmore and Representative Jason Kyle have publicly advanced a taxpayer-protection rationale. Their argument should be evaluated on its merits. At the same time, their participation in other legislation concerning initiative procedures makes their broader approach to direct democracy a legitimate subject of examination.
The Utah Taxpayers Association’s support for Amendment B adds another dimension. Its involvement is consistent with its public mission of fiscal advocacy, but it also raises questions about the organizations financing constitutional campaigns, their relationships with elected officials, and the extent to which voters understand those relationships.
What the Voters Are Really Deciding
Amendment B asks voters to decide whether the value of broader agreement before imposing certain taxes outweighs the value of retaining the ordinary majority standard for those citizen initiatives.
It is possible to favor low taxes and still question whether the people’s reserved legislative authority should be subject to a higher popular-vote threshold than ordinary tax legislation. It is equally possible to support citizen initiatives generally while believing that tax increases should require stronger public consensus.
Those positions need not be treated as contradictory. They reflect competing judgments about constitutional design.
What should not be lost is the institutional consequence. If approved, Amendment B would establish a permanent constitutional distinction between specified tax measures proposed by citizens and ordinary tax measures enacted through the Legislature. Future generations would inherit that distinction unless they amended the Constitution again.
The question is therefore larger than whether a particular tax proposal is desirable. It concerns the rules under which citizens and their elected representatives exercise lawmaking power.
To understand why these changes are being proposed, and whether they reflect independent judgments or a wider philosophy of legislative authority, we must examine the people who sponsored them, the leaders who shaped the surrounding constitutional debate, and the political relationships connecting those decisions.
Section 6: The People Behind the Amendments
Legislative Leadership, Political Alliances, and the Struggle Over Constitutional Authority
Constitutions do not rewrite themselves. Behind every proposed amendment are people who introduce the legislation, persuade their colleagues, negotiate its language, and explain to voters why the change is necessary. Utah’s Amendments A and B are no exception. Both originated in the Legislature during the 2025 general session, both would alter constitutional procedures, and both emerged against the backdrop of a prolonged conflict over the people’s initiative power. Yet their sponsors, purposes, and legislative histories are not identical. Understanding those differences is essential if we are to determine whether the amendments represent independent policy decisions, a broader institutional philosophy, or something more coordinated.
Four legislators occupy the most immediate positions in this story: Representative Anthony Loubet and Senator Daniel McCay, who sponsored Amendment A, and Senator Lincoln Fillmore and Representative Jason Kyle, who sponsored Amendment B. Beyond them stand Senate President Stuart Adams, House Speaker Mike Schultz, and Senate Majority Leader Kirk Cullimore, whose public statements and leadership responsibilities place them at the center of the wider dispute over citizen initiatives. These officials are not strangers operating in separate political worlds. They serve within the same legislative institution, participate in overlapping committees and policy debates, and have taken positions on questions involving the Legislature’s authority. But shared institutional interests are not evidence of secret coordination. To establish anything beyond ordinary legislative cooperation, we must examine what they actually did, said, proposed, and financed.
Amendment A: Anthony Loubet and Daniel McCay
Representative Anthony Loubet became the principal legislative advocate for changing Utah’s constitutional publication requirement. His proposal, House Joint Resolution 10, was accompanied by House Bill 481, which established the statutory procedures that would apply if voters approved Amendment A. Senator Daniel McCay served as the Senate sponsor. Together, the measures would replace the Constitution’s newspaper-publication language with a requirement for 60 days of notice through methods prescribed by statute, including designated government websites.
Loubet’s public explanation is especially relevant because it connects the proposal directly to the court decisions that invalidated proposed constitutional amendments in 2024. In a February 2025 interview with the Deseret News, he described reading the court’s interpretation and recognizing an opportunity to bring constitutional publication rules into alignment with modern practices. His argument was that physical newspaper publication no longer reflects how most people receive public information, and that the Legislature has a responsibility to address procedural requirements that no longer serve their original purpose effectively.
That explanation deserves to be presented fairly. Loubet did not need to conceal the relationship between his proposal and the court’s ruling, because he publicly acknowledged it. The question is not whether the amendment arose in response to the judicial decisions. His own statements support that connection. The more important question is whether the resulting change preserves an equally reliable constitutional safeguard, or transfers too much discretion to future legislatures. McCay’s participation, meanwhile, links the proposal to the Senate’s legislative process, but does not by itself establish that the amendment was part of a larger effort to restore legislative control over citizen initiatives.
The committee record reveals another useful distinction. Amendment A received broad support, including favorable committee recommendations without recorded opposing votes among those voting. The House approved it 70–0 and the Senate 29–0. The Alliance for a Better Utah, an organization often critical of legislative efforts to restrict initiative power, took a neutral position during committee consideration while acknowledging the argument for modernizing publication requirements. That is important evidence against treating every organization or legislator involved as part of two rigidly opposed camps. Agreement on one procedural reform does not necessarily imply agreement on the broader constitutional disputes surrounding Proposition 4.
Amendment B: Lincoln Fillmore and Jason Kyle
Senator Lincoln Fillmore and Representative Jason Kyle pursued a different constitutional change. Their proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 2, would require 60% voter approval for certain statewide citizen initiatives involving taxation. The proposal does not impose an equivalent statewide approval threshold on ordinary tax legislation enacted by the Legislature.
Fillmore’s public defense of Amendment B centers on taxpayer protection and the differences between direct legislation and representative government. He argues that when citizens are asked to approve taxes affecting other citizens, a broader consensus should be required. He also emphasizes that elected lawmakers can be held accountable for tax decisions through subsequent elections, whereas individual voters cannot be removed from office for supporting an initiative.
The opposing argument is that the people already possess a constitutionally reserved legislative power and should not face a higher approval threshold merely because they exercise that power directly. In this view, Amendment B would create an imbalance by making certain citizen-enacted tax laws harder to pass while preserving the Legislature’s ordinary authority to enact taxes.
The disagreement is genuine, and the legislative record reflects it. Amendment B passed, but not unanimously. Its supporters and opponents divided over whether the higher threshold would protect taxpayers or unnecessarily restrict direct democracy.
Fillmore’s role also extends beyond Amendment B. He sponsored Senate Bill 73 during the same 2025 session, with Kyle participating as the House sponsor. That legislation concerned statewide initiative procedures, including requirements associated with informing voters. It is relevant because it demonstrates that the two sponsors were working on more than one proposal affecting the initiative process. Whether those proposals shared a broader strategic objective must be assessed through their text, legislative debate, and the sponsors’ explanations, rather than inferred solely from common sponsorship.
The Leadership Question: Adams, Schultz, and Cullimore
The broader struggle over legislative authority brings three additional figures into focus.
Senate President Stuart Adams and House Speaker Mike Schultz were central to the Legislature’s response to the 2024 Utah Supreme Court decision. They publicly defended the Legislature’s authority to amend citizen-enacted laws and helped advance Amendment D during the August 2024 special session. The Supreme Court later found that Amendment D’s official ballot description failed to adequately disclose the proposed expansion of legislative authority and that its submission did not satisfy the constitutional publication requirement.
Their involvement did not end with Amendment D’s failure. As the Proposition 4 litigation continued, Adams and Schultz remained outspoken critics of the court’s interpretation of initiative power. Following subsequent redistricting rulings, legislative leaders discussed another constitutional amendment intended to place initiative-enacted laws and ordinary legislative statutes on what they described as a more equal footing.
Senate Majority Leader Kirk Cullimore also became a prominent voice in that discussion. His position is significant because he publicly explained the leadership’s continuing interest in restoring what it viewed as the Legislature’s traditional authority over initiatives.
The dispute was therefore not confined to the four legislators sponsoring Amendments A and B. It involved a broader disagreement among legislative leaders, initiative advocates, and the judiciary over the proper division of constitutional authority.
That disagreement provides important context, but it does not establish that Amendments A and B were secretly coordinated with Amendment D. Amendment A concerns the procedure for publishing proposed constitutional amendments. Amendment B concerns the voter-approval threshold for certain tax-related initiatives. Amendment D concerned the Legislature’s authority over voter-enacted laws. Each proposal must be evaluated according to its own language, legislative history, and stated purpose.
The connections among their sponsors and legislative leaders warrant examination because the proposals arose within the same institutional conflict. But evidence of shared political interests is not evidence of an unlawful agreement. Establishing deliberate coordination would require additional documentation, such as drafting records, communications, meeting records, or financial evidence connecting the decisions.
The central question is therefore not whether these lawmakers knew one another or participated in the same political debates. They plainly operated within the same legislative institution. The question is whether the documented sequence of proposals reveals a consistent approach to constitutional authority, and what that approach would mean for the powers reserved to Utah’s citizens.
That distinction matters. The sponsors of Amendments A and B should be evaluated according to the proposals they introduced, their public explanations, and their legislative actions. Legislative leaders should likewise be examined according to their own statements, votes, and documented decisions. Shared political interests do not establish shared motives, and institutional relationships alone do not prove improper coordination. Responsibility must be established through evidence attributable to each participant.
The Continuing Effort to Restore Legislative Authority
The public record demonstrates that Amendment D’s failure did not end legislative leadership’s interest in changing the constitutional relationship between initiatives and ordinary legislation. After the 2024 court decisions and subsequent redistricting rulings, legislative leaders continued discussing another constitutional amendment that would restore broader legislative discretion over voter-enacted laws.
That continuing effort is important because it identifies an objective that leadership openly acknowledged. The proposed restoration of legislative authority was not merely a theory advanced by critics. It was a stated policy position.
Yet the distinction between that objective and Amendments A and B remains essential. Amendment A concerns publication procedures. Amendment B concerns a higher approval threshold for certain citizen-initiated tax measures. Neither would directly enact the broad restoration of legislative authority sought through Amendment D.
The more defensible investigative conclusion is that these measures arose within a political environment in which legislative power and citizen initiative rights were being actively reconsidered. Whether they were planned as elements of a single strategy requires evidence beyond their timing and the overlapping relationships among legislators.
Legislative Relationships and Political Influence
Utah’s Legislature is a relatively small political institution. Sponsors work with committee chairs, legislative leaders, policy advocates, attorneys, and outside organizations. Relationships among those participants are normal and often necessary to develop legislation. Political organizations also communicate with lawmakers who share their positions.
Such relationships become investigative concerns when they bear directly on decisions affecting constitutional authority, particularly if significant financial support or undisclosed participation is involved.
For Amendments A and B, the relevant questions include who first proposed the language, which organizations reviewed or advocated particular provisions, whether legislative sponsors received substantive drafting assistance from outside interests, and what communications accompanied the proposals’ development.
The existence of those questions does not establish misconduct. Their answers would help distinguish ordinary legislative collaboration from a coordinated political effort whose full scope has not been publicly explained.
The Utah Taxpayers Association’s support for Amendment B is one publicly identifiable relationship. Other advocacy organizations have opposed the measure, arguing that it would restrict the people’s initiative power. Both sides have interests in the outcome, and both deserve examination under the same standards of transparency.
A credible investigation should not treat financial or organizational relationships as suspicious only when they belong to one side of the campaign.
What the Legislative Record Reveals
The known legislative history establishes several meaningful distinctions. Amendment A received overwhelming support in both chambers, suggesting that its publication-modernization rationale attracted broad legislative agreement. Amendment B passed with opposition, reflecting a more substantial disagreement over the constitutional consequences of imposing a 60% threshold on certain citizen initiatives.
The sponsors also had different roles in the broader initiative debate. Fillmore and Kyle participated in additional legislation concerning initiative procedures, while Loubet publicly connected his publication proposal to the constitutional issues raised by the 2024 litigation. Legislative leaders Adams, Schultz, and Cullimore pursued a more expansive argument concerning the Legislature’s authority to revise voter-enacted government reforms.
Taken together, these relationships reveal identifiable political participants, overlapping constitutional interests, and differences in legislative priorities. They provide legitimate grounds for examining how Utah’s amendment proposals developed, but they do not establish an undisclosed agreement or improper coordination.
The more important investigative question is whether the recurring legislative actions reflect independent policy decisions, a shared philosophy of governmental authority, or a coordinated strategy extending beyond what the public record presently establishes.
The Question Behind the Names
The significance of these individuals lies not simply in their titles or political affiliations, but in the authority they exercise. They are participants in a constitutional system where elected representatives possess substantial powers while citizens retain specific powers of their own.
When lawmakers propose changes to the procedures governing those reserved powers, the public is entitled to understand who developed the proposals, who supported them, what interests participated, and how the resulting changes would affect the constitutional balance.
The evidence examined so far identifies a recurring disagreement over that balance, a number of influential participants, and proposals that would alter distinct aspects of constitutional procedure. It does not establish that those participants operated under a hidden command structure or entered into an unlawful agreement.
But the recurrence of the same constitutional questions across several legislative sessions makes the broader pattern worthy of examination.
Were these separate policy decisions responding to different problems? Were they expressions of a shared philosophy favoring stronger representative institutions? Or did they form part of a coordinated effort to shift additional authority away from direct citizen action?
The answer must come from the record, not from assumptions about the people involved.
That is the question the next section examines.
Section 7: A Pattern of Legislative Power
Coincidence, Constitutional Philosophy, or Coordinated Strategy?
The Pattern Behind the Individual Battles
The individuals and organizations examined in the preceding chapter are important, but the larger question concerns the pattern of government action in which they participated.
Since Utah voters approved Proposition 4 in 2018, the state has experienced a succession of disputes involving citizen initiatives, legislative authority, constitutional amendments, and judicial enforcement of constitutional limits. Each controversy has its own legal history and political justification. Viewed together, however, they raise a question that cannot be answered by examining any single amendment in isolation: Has Utah’s political leadership developed a consistent approach to preserving or expanding legislative authority when confronted with constitutional restraints imposed by the people?
The starting point is especially revealing because the conflict did not begin with a constitutional amendment. It began with a citizen initiative. Utah voters approved Proposition 4 to change how their government drew political boundaries. The Legislature then replaced important parts of that reform, and the dispute eventually reached the Utah Supreme Court. When the court recognized constitutional limits on legislative interference with voter-enacted government reforms, legislative leaders did not abandon their position. They sought to change the constitutional rule through Amendment D. After the courts prevented that proposal from taking effect because of defects in its submission, the Legislature approved Amendment A, which would alter one of the publication requirements involved in that failure. Meanwhile, Amendment B proposed a higher approval threshold for certain citizen-initiated tax measures. The sequence does not prove that every proposal was conceived as part of a single strategy, but it does establish that the constitutional authority of citizens remained a recurring subject of legislative action.
The important question is whether these measures merely happened to concern related subjects or reflected a consistent philosophy about how government should function. The available evidence supports the existence of that philosophy. Legislative leaders have repeatedly argued that representative institutions must retain sufficient authority to revise laws, respond to changing circumstances, and protect the public from poorly designed initiatives. Their opponents have argued that the initiative process exists precisely because the people sometimes need to act independently of those institutions. Both positions involve legitimate questions of constitutional design. But they begin from different assumptions about where governmental power should be concentrated and how it should be restrained.
Two Competing Understandings of Representative Government
The Legislature’s position has an identifiable constitutional rationale. Utah’s government is primarily representative, and lawmakers are expected to exercise judgment on behalf of their constituents. They can hold hearings, examine fiscal consequences, negotiate compromises, and revise legislation when circumstances change. Supporters of broader legislative authority contend that citizen initiatives should not become effectively immune from those ordinary functions merely because they originated at the ballot box. They also argue that legislators are accountable to voters, who can replace them if they misuse their authority.
The competing position begins with the Constitution’s express reservation of power to the people. The initiative process is not simply another way to suggest legislation to lawmakers. It permits citizens to enact laws directly, sometimes in response to the Legislature’s refusal to act. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that this reserved authority carries additional constitutional protection when citizens use it to reform government itself. Without such protection, an initiative intended to restrain elected officials could be dismantled by the same officials it was designed to regulate. That concern was central to the Proposition 4 litigation.
These competing interpretations explain much of the controversy without requiring an assumption of corruption. A legislator can sincerely believe that broad legislative discretion produces better government. A citizen can sincerely believe that such discretion becomes dangerous when lawmakers are allowed to weaken reforms aimed at their own institutional power. The difficult task is determining where legitimate disagreement ends and unconstitutional interference begins. In the Proposition 4 case, the courts identified constitutional limits and later found that the Legislature’s repeal and replacement of the voter-approved reform violated them.
The Legislature’s subsequent response is therefore relevant. It was not merely defending an ordinary policy decision. It was challenging a judicial interpretation of the constitutional limits on its own authority. The August 2024 announcement by Senate President Stuart Adams and House Speaker Mike Schultz expressly described Amendment D as an effort to restore what they considered the traditional relationship between initiatives and legislative lawmaking. Their stated objective was public, not concealed. Whether voters agreed with it was another matter.
The Procedural Changes That Deserve Attention
The next part of the pattern involves procedures rather than substantive policy. Procedures can appear less important than questions of taxation or redistricting, but they determine how citizens exercise their rights and how constitutional changes are presented to the public. A requirement to collect signatures, publish an initiative, disclose its financial effects, or obtain a particular percentage of votes can substantially influence whether a proposal ever becomes law.
This is why the procedural character of Amendments A and B should not cause voters to dismiss their constitutional significance. Amendment A would change who determines the method of publishing proposed constitutional amendments. Amendment B would change the percentage of voter approval required for specified tax-related initiatives. Both concern the rules under which constitutional or legislative authority is exercised, even though their immediate subjects differ.
Senate Bill 73, sponsored by Fillmore with Kyle serving as House sponsor during the 2025 session, also belongs in this broader examination because it concerned procedures associated with statewide initiatives and public information. Its precise provisions and implementation should be assessed through the enacted statutory text, but its presence in the same legislative session illustrates that initiative procedures were receiving attention through ordinary legislation as well as constitutional proposals.
The important analytical question is whether these changes improve the integrity of direct democracy or make the exercise of citizen authority more difficult than necessary. A publication requirement may help voters understand a proposal. A financial-disclosure requirement may reveal important costs. A higher approval threshold may protect against narrowly supported tax increases. But procedural rules can also create obstacles, and those obstacles may have very different effects on ordinary citizens than on established political institutions with substantial resources.
The Difference Between a Pattern and a Conspiracy
A pattern is a sequence of actions exhibiting identifiable similarities. A conspiracy implies an agreement to pursue a particular objective, often through concealed or improper means. The first can be demonstrated through public records. The second requires evidence of coordination and purpose beyond mere similarity.
The documented pattern in Utah is substantial. Citizens approved a government-reform initiative. The Legislature replaced important parts of it. Courts recognized constitutional protections for such reforms. Legislative leaders sought to change those protections through Amendment D. After the amendment failed because of defects in its submission, lawmakers approved Amendment A, addressing one of the constitutional procedures involved in that failure, and Amendment B, creating a higher approval threshold for specified citizen tax initiatives.
That sequence supports the conclusion that the relationship between legislative authority and citizen power has been a recurring institutional concern.
It does not prove that Amendments A and B were secretly designed to accomplish Amendment D’s objectives. They would not have the same legal effect. Nor does it prove that every legislator who supported them intended to weaken citizen rights.
A more precise finding is that the Legislature has repeatedly pursued changes affecting the powers and procedures through which citizens participate directly in government, while legislative leaders have openly challenged judicial limits on their authority over certain voter-enacted reforms.
That finding is consequential without being exaggerated.
What Would Establish Coordination?
To move beyond identifying a pattern, an investigation would need more specific evidence. Legislative drafting records, communications among sponsors and leadership, advocacy-group correspondence, and contemporaneous statements could help determine whether particular proposals were developed independently or as part of a shared plan.
Financial records may also establish relationships between amendment sponsors and political organizations. But those records must be interpreted carefully. Contributions from an advocacy organization to a legislator who shares its policy preferences do not establish that the organization directed legislation. Participation in a campaign committee does not establish that an amendment was introduced for an improper purpose.
The dates, amounts, participants, communications, and stated objectives matter. Without them, claims of hidden control remain allegations rather than findings.
The same standard applies to opponents of the amendments. Their organizational relationships and campaign financing should also be examined, not because participation in advocacy is inherently suspicious, but because voters deserve to understand the interests attempting to influence constitutional decisions.
The Constitutional Stakes
There is a larger lesson in this history. Governmental power can be changed through highly visible actions, such as repealing a law or proposing a constitutional amendment. It can also be affected by changes to procedures that determine who may propose legislation, how proposals reach the ballot, what information voters receive, and what level of support is required for adoption.
Those procedures are part of the architecture of political authority.
The question is not whether the Legislature should ever revise them. Legislatures must be able to improve laws and address genuine administrative problems. The question is whether changes to the people’s reserved powers are justified, clearly explained, and consistent with the constitutional balance Utahns wish to preserve.
The evidence establishes a continuing conflict over that balance. It establishes a series of legislative actions, judicial responses, and proposed constitutional changes. It also establishes publicly expressed differences in constitutional philosophy.
Whether the sequence reveals improper coordination remains unproven.
But political influence does not operate through constitutional interpretation alone. Organizations finance campaigns, support candidates, and help shape the arguments presented to voters. If the objective is to understand who influences Utah’s constitutional decisions, those relationships must be examined as carefully as the legislative record.
That brings us to the money.
Section 8: Following the Money
Political Organizations, Campaign Contributions, and Influence
The Financial Trail Behind Constitutional Politics
Political power is not exercised through legislation alone. It also depends on who can finance campaigns, support candidates, organize advocacy groups, purchase advertising, and persuade voters that a proposed constitutional change is in their best interests. Those activities are not inherently improper. They are familiar features of American politics. But when the subject is the Constitution itself, the public has a particular interest in knowing who is financing the effort to change it, which officials have received support from those interests, and whether the financial relationships help explain the political decisions being made.
Utah’s Amendments A and B provide an opportunity to examine those relationships. Amendment A concerns the procedures for notifying voters about proposed constitutional changes. Amendment B would require 60% approval for certain citizen-initiated tax measures. Both were approved by the Legislature in 2025, but Amendment B has attracted the more visible organized campaign. The Utah Taxpayers Association and Taxpayer Shield PAC have emerged among its supporters, while Utahns Protecting Our Constitution and organizations associated with the earlier Better Boundaries effort have opposed it. These groups are asking citizens to make a lasting constitutional decision. Their arguments deserve consideration, and their financial disclosures deserve scrutiny.
The investigation becomes more interesting when we look beyond campaign slogans. The Weber County Hive, an independent investigative publication, has assembled a detailed examination of the two amendments, their sponsors, political committees, and related financial records. Its findings identify relationships that merit further investigation, including campaign contributions from the Utah Taxpayers Association’s political action committee to legislators associated with the amendments. The Hive also identifies a more direct organizational connection involving Senator Lincoln Fillmore, the principal sponsor of Amendment B, and Taxpayer Shield PAC, an organization supporting that same proposal.
These are significant leads, but the distinction between a published finding and an independently verified finding must be preserved. The Hive identifies underlying state disclosure records and describes exports downloaded on October 7, 2026. REPRO has not yet independently reconciled every transaction against the state’s original campaign-finance database. The figures below are therefore attributed to The Hive until that verification is completed.
The Utah Taxpayers Association: Advocacy and Political Access
The Utah Taxpayers Association has long participated in debates over taxation, public spending, and fiscal policy. Its support for Amendment B is consistent with its stated emphasis on protecting taxpayers from additional burdens. Its president, Billy Hesterman, has publicly defended the proposal on the grounds that tax increases should require broader agreement among those who must pay them.
The association also operates through a political action committee. According to The Weber County Hive’s examination of Utah financial disclosure exports covering November 2021 through October 7, 2026, the Utah Taxpayers Association PAC reported approximately $56,135.96 in incoming funds and $57,125 in expenditures during the periods examined. The Hive identifies contributions from the association itself and from companies and trade organizations, including businesses in the energy, banking, healthcare, and tourism sectors.
Those contributors do not all necessarily share the same positions on every issue. A business supporting a tax-policy organization may be interested in general fiscal advocacy rather than any particular constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, the funding sources matter because they help citizens understand which interests support organizations participating in public-policy debates.
The Hive also reports that the Utah Taxpayers Association PAC contributed $6,500 to Senator Lincoln Fillmore’s campaign, $3,000 to Senator Daniel McCay, $500 to Representative Anthony Loubet, and $200 to Representative Jason Kyle during the periods examined. The reported total for these four legislators is $10,200. These figures cover historical contributions, not necessarily payments connected to the 2025 sponsorship of Amendments A and B or the 2026 ballot campaign.
That timing distinction is essential. A contribution made years before an amendment was proposed cannot reasonably be described as payment for sponsoring that amendment without additional evidence. Even a contribution made during the same legislative session would not establish an improper exchange. Political action committees routinely support candidates who share their policy preferences, and candidates routinely receive contributions from numerous organizations.
The significance of the reported contributions is therefore limited but real. They establish a potential financial relationship worth verifying, and they identify the individuals and organizations whose connections should be examined more closely. They do not establish that the Utah Taxpayers Association directed the drafting of either amendment, purchased legislative votes, or exercised improper control over its sponsors.
Taxpayer Shield PAC: A More Direct Connection
Taxpayer Shield PAC presents a different investigative question because its reported leadership structure includes one of Amendment B’s principal sponsors.
According to the organizational filing examined by The Weber County Hive, Taxpayer Shield PAC was registered on December 1, 2025, after the Legislature had already approved Amendment B. The filing identifies Senator Lincoln Fillmore as chairman, Russell “Rusty” Cannon as vice chairman, Brian K. Chapman as executive director and treasurer, and Howard Headlee and Billy Hesterman as board members.
If confirmed against the original organizational filing, this would establish a direct relationship between Senator Lincoln Fillmore and Taxpayer Shield PAC. Fillmore would occupy two distinct roles: legislative sponsor of Amendment B and chairman of a political committee supporting that amendment. The committee’s reported December 2025 registration is also important because it occurred after the Legislature approved Amendment B earlier that year. The organizational relationship therefore warrants scrutiny of the subsequent ballot campaign, but it does not establish that the committee financed, directed, or influenced the original legislative proposal.
Legislators may lawfully participate in political advocacy, and political committees may support ballot measures consistent with their policy positions, subject to applicable campaign-finance and ethics requirements. Nevertheless, an elected official’s reported simultaneous roles as an amendment sponsor and chairman of a committee advocating for that amendment warrant public disclosure and examination of the committee’s activities.
The relevant questions concern transparency, financing, and responsibility. Who provided the committee’s initial funding? Who made its spending decisions? What communications occurred between committee officers, legislative sponsors, and other political organizations? Were expenditures properly reported and attributed? And did the committee’s public messaging accurately describe the constitutional consequences of Amendment B?
According to the financial material summarized by The Weber County Hive, an October 7, 2026 disclosure export reflected a reported $2,000 loan and approximately $1,812.66 in expenditures associated with Taxpayer Shield PAC. These figures should not be treated as a complete accounting of the campaign or as independently verified totals until the underlying records, reporting periods, and any subsequent filings are reviewed.
The organizational relationship is a meaningful investigative lead. It is not evidence that Fillmore received improper compensation, that the amendment was purchased, or that the committee engaged in unlawful conduct.
Documented Overlapping Leadership Between Political Action Committees
Official Statements of Organization filed with the Utah Lieutenant Governor’s Office identify Billy Hesterman as president and treasurer of the Utah Taxpayers Association PAC and as a governing board member of Taxpayer SHIELD PAC. The Taxpayer SHIELD PAC filing also identifies Senator Lincoln Fillmore as chairman, Rusty Cannon as vice-chairman, and Brian K. Chapman as executive director and treasurer.
These records establish overlapping leadership between the two political action committees. They do not, by themselves, establish improper coordination, undisclosed financial transactions, or violations of campaign-finance law. They do, however, provide a documented basis for examining the organizational relationships, financial activities, and decision-making structures relevant to this investigation.
Primary sources: Utah Lieutenant Governor’s campaign-finance disclosure system, Statements of Organization for Utah Taxpayers Association PAC and Taxpayer SHIELD PAC.
The Other Side of the Campaign
A fair investigation must apply the same scrutiny to organizations opposing Amendment B.
Utahns Protecting Our Constitution, Better Boundaries, and other organizations associated with the opposition have publicly argued that the amendment would restrict the people’s ability to enact tax-related laws directly. Their position is consistent with the broader concern that citizen initiative rights should not be weakened through additional constitutional barriers.
The importance of that argument does not exempt its advocates from the same financial scrutiny applied to Amendment B’s supporters. This investigation has identified opposition organizations and their publicly stated positions, but it has not yet completed a comparable review of their campaign-finance disclosures. Until those records are examined, no conclusion should be drawn about the relative financial influence, donor relationships, or spending practices of either side. Voters deserve to know who financed the opposition campaign, which consultants and advertising vendors were retained, and whether any organizational relationships bear directly on the amendment debate.
Public records relating to political advertising can help establish where money was spent and which organizations sponsored particular messages. Federal Communications Commission political files, for example, provide an avenue for examining certain broadcast advertising activity. State campaign-finance disclosures may identify additional spending and organizational relationships.
The goal should not be to imply that advocacy is improper. The goal is to give voters a complete account of who is attempting to influence their decision.
Contributions Are Evidence of Relationships, Not Proof of Control
The reported Utah Taxpayers Association PAC contributions raise questions about relationships between political advocacy organizations and legislators involved in constitutional policy decisions. But the significance of those relationships depends on chronology, documented conduct, and the circumstances surrounding individual contributions.
The investigation must establish when contributions occurred, whether donors participated in developing or promoting amendment language, and whether communications or commitments connected financial support to legislative action. Shared policy preferences may explain political contributions without implying an improper exchange. Conversely, documented participation in drafting, financing, or coordinating an amendment campaign may reveal relationships deserving closer public examination.
The distinction is essential: financial contributions can identify relationships and investigative leads, but they do not independently establish legislative control, improper influence, or unlawful conduct. Those conclusions require additional evidence. The same standard must apply to political committees supporting or opposing the amendments.
The Missing Pieces of the Financial Record
Several important questions remain unresolved because the underlying financial records have not yet been fully reconciled.
The reported Utah Taxpayers Association PAC contributions require comparison with original Utah campaign-finance disclosures to establish the dates, amounts, recipients, and reporting committees involved. Likewise, the original organizational filing for Taxpayer Shield PAC must be examined to confirm its officers, registration history, and subsequent financial activity. These records are necessary to distinguish established financial relationships from claims that remain dependent on secondary reporting.
The same standard applies to organizations opposing Amendment B. Their donors, political committees, expenditures, and organizational relationships warrant comparable examination. Without that review, the available evidence cannot support a meaningful comparison of the financial influence exercised by supporters and opponents.
A further question concerns participation in developing amendment language and campaign messaging. Did advocacy organizations, consultants, or financial contributors participate in drafting proposals, shaping public explanations, or coordinating campaign activities? Such participation is not inherently improper, but documented involvement would help citizens understand how legislative proposals and organized political advocacy intersect.
Until these records are independently verified, the financial findings in this investigation must be understood as attributed relationships and investigative leads, not proof of corruption, improper influence, or unlawful coordination.
What the Money Can Tell Us
Campaign-finance records rarely explain political motives by themselves. They reveal transactions, organizational relationships, and patterns of support. Properly verified, those records can help investigators identify connections, examine the timing of political activity, and compare public explanations with documented conduct.
In Utah’s constitutional amendment debate, the available evidence identifies several relationships among legislators, advocacy organizations, and political committees that warrant examination. Some are publicly acknowledged; others remain dependent on secondary reporting. The financial information reviewed for this investigation does not establish that Amendments A or B were purchased, that legislative votes were improperly influenced, or that unlawful coordination occurred.
But financial transparency serves a purpose beyond uncovering wrongdoing. Citizens have a legitimate interest in knowing who supports proposed constitutional changes, who finances the campaigns surrounding them, and whether political organizations disclose their activities accurately. Those questions remain important regardless of whether an investigation ultimately identifies misconduct.
Money is only one part of that story. Political organizations also influence public understanding through advertising, public statements, opinion columns, and news coverage. The next question is whether Utah’s media provides citizens with the historical context, competing arguments, and verified information necessary to evaluate proposed constitutional changes for themselves.
Section 9: Money, Media, and Public Messaging
Watchdogs, Messengers, or Participants?
Who Controls the Story?
Alongside Utah’s dispute over constitutional authority is another consequential question: how do voters obtain the information needed to evaluate proposed constitutional changes? Legislators propose amendments, advocacy organizations promote competing interpretations, and political campaigns seek public support. Yet most citizens cannot independently examine every legislative record, court decision, financial disclosure, and constitutional provision before voting. News organizations therefore play an important role in explaining both the proposals and the disputes surrounding them. Their coverage can illuminate the evidence, clarify competing arguments, and identify unanswered questions. It can also leave significant gaps when essential historical or legal context is omitted.
That dependence places considerable responsibility on journalists. A news organization can accurately repeat the text of Amendment A or Amendment B and still leave readers without a meaningful understanding of the controversy. It can quote supporters and opponents, describe their disagreements, and publish a perfectly balanced collection of sound bites while overlooking the history that gives those disagreements their significance. Conversely, an outlet can emphasize constitutional concerns so strongly that it fails to give a fair account of the legitimate arguments advanced by an amendment’s sponsors. Neither approach fully serves the public.
The Republic Project’s investigation must therefore examine more than whether an article was favorable or unfavorable toward a proposed amendment. The more important questions concern accuracy, completeness, sourcing, and context. Did the reporting explain what the amendment would actually change? Did it distinguish legal consequences from political predictions? Did it connect the proposal to relevant court decisions without exaggerating that connection? Did it examine the organizations financing the campaign? And did it give readers enough information to reach their own conclusions?
The challenge is especially apparent in coverage of Utah’s constitutional amendments. Voters may encounter an accurate explanation of an individual proposal without learning how it fits into the longer dispute over citizen initiatives and legislative authority. That missing context can be as consequential to public understanding as an incorrect statement about the amendment itself.
The Media’s Constitutional Role
The importance of public information was brought into unusually sharp focus by the Utah Supreme Court’s decision concerning Amendment D. One of the defects identified by the court was the Legislature’s failure to publish the proposed amendment in the manner required by the Constitution. Another was the misleading official ballot description, which did not adequately disclose that the amendment would remove constitutional limits on legislative authority over citizen-enacted government reforms.
In defending Amendment D, legislative officials pointed in part to the extensive publicity surrounding the proposal. The issue had received considerable attention from newspapers, broadcasters, advocacy organizations, and political commentators. Voters, the argument suggested, had ample opportunity to learn about it.
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that such coverage could replace the government’s constitutional obligations.
The ruling reinforced an important distinction between public discussion and official constitutional requirements. Independent journalism, advocacy campaigns, and political advertising may help citizens understand a proposed amendment, but widespread public discussion does not excuse noncompliance with the Constitution’s requirements for submitting an amendment to voters. In Amendment D’s case, the court identified defects in both the official ballot description and the required publication process. The government’s legal obligations must be evaluated independently of how extensively the proposal was discussed in the media.
This distinction also raises an important question about Amendment A. If the Legislature is permitted to prescribe the publication method for proposed constitutional amendments, how will voters know whether that method provides reliable and accessible notice? A government website may be an effective means of publication, but the existence of a notice somewhere online does not necessarily mean that citizens will encounter it. Newspaper publication also has limitations, including declining circulation and uneven geographic reach. The real question is whether the chosen method fulfills the constitutional purpose of informing voters before they are asked to change their fundamental governing document.
A responsible media investigation should examine that question rather than simply accept the claim that electronic notice is modern or the counterclaim that eliminating mandatory newspaper publication necessarily undermines transparency.
Utah News Dispatch: Following the Institutional Conflict
Among the outlets that have provided continuing coverage of Utah’s initiative disputes is Utah News Dispatch. Its reporting has followed the Proposition 4 litigation, legislative reactions to court decisions, the failure of Amendment D, and subsequent discussions about another constitutional amendment addressing initiative power. This continuity is important because the significance of Amendments A and B cannot be fully understood from their ballot descriptions alone.
Utah News Dispatch reported on legislative leadership’s response to the courts, including the November 2024 acknowledgment of mistakes surrounding Amendment D and the July 2026 decision to postpone another broad initiative-power amendment. Its October 2026 coverage also addressed the proposed amendments appearing on the general-election ballot.
The value of this reporting lies partly in its attention to chronology. Coverage across multiple legislative sessions can help readers follow how the constitutional disagreement has developed. However, the articles identified in this investigation have not yet been subjected to a comprehensive review of their sourcing, legal context, or treatment of competing arguments. It would therefore be premature to conclude that Utah News Dispatch has consistently provided complete coverage, omitted significant evidence, or favored a particular institutional position. Such findings require examination of individual articles and a documented comparison of what each reported.
The question for REPRO is whether the coverage has consistently explained the underlying constitutional stakes or whether readers have sometimes been left with a narrower account focused on legislative personalities and immediate political conflict. That question should be answered through a documented review of articles, not assumptions about the publication’s motives.
KUER: Explaining the Ballot to Ordinary Voters
KUER’s October 13, 2026, election guide approached Amendments A and B from a different direction. Rather than beginning with a lengthy account of Utah’s political history, it focused on helping voters understand what the proposed constitutional changes would do.
That is a legitimate and valuable journalistic function. Most citizens approaching an election want clear answers to practical questions. What does a yes vote mean? What does a no vote mean? What changes if the amendment passes? Those questions should be answered accurately and without requiring readers to become constitutional scholars.
An election explainer, however, serves a narrower purpose than a comprehensive investigation. KUER’s October 13 guide should be evaluated first on whether it accurately explained the language and practical consequences of Amendments A and B. A separate question is how much historical and constitutional context it provided. For Amendment A, that context includes the Utah Supreme Court’s enforcement of the existing publication requirement in the Amendment D litigation. For Amendment B, it includes the distinction between the proposed 60% approval requirement for specified tax-related initiatives and the approval rules governing ordinary legislation. Whether KUER adequately addressed these matters requires examination of the guide itself and the outlet’s related reporting.
Those omissions, if present in a particular article, are not necessarily evidence of bias. Newsrooms make editorial decisions about length, audience, and scope. The appropriate question is whether the outlet’s overall coverage, including related reporting, provided the missing context.
The Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret News, and KSL
Utah’s larger news organizations have also played important roles in presenting the constitutional amendment debate to the public. The Salt Lake Tribune has covered the redistricting litigation and the Legislature’s disputes with the courts, while its opinion pages have expressed positions on proposed constitutional changes. Deseret News has published election coverage as well as guest commentary from Amendment B’s legislative sponsors. KSL has reported competing arguments about the initiative threshold and the broader political controversy.
These differences matter because news reporting, editorial opinion, guest commentary, and paid political advertising are not interchangeable. A newspaper editorial opposing Amendment B is an openly expressed institutional opinion. A guest article by Fillmore and Kyle defending their amendment is political advocacy published under the authors’ names. A news article quoting both sides is a journalistic account that should be judged by its accuracy, sourcing, and completeness. Treating all three as evidence of media collusion would erase distinctions essential to evaluating the record.
The Deseret News publication of an October 8 guest opinion by Fillmore and Kyle is a useful example. The sponsors used that opportunity to explain why they believed tax increases enacted through citizen initiatives should require broader support. Publishing their argument does not establish that the newspaper endorsed their position. It does establish that the sponsors had access to a public forum where voters could read their reasoning directly.
The same standard applies to opposing commentary. Publishing an argument against Amendment B does not establish that a news organization is secretly working with its opponents. Evidence of actual coordination would require more than agreement in editorial perspective.
A comprehensive review of these outlets should examine their reporting across the relevant legislative sessions and election campaigns, not isolated articles alone. The review should document which stories explained the constitutional provisions at issue, presented the sponsors’ reasoning, included substantive opposing arguments, consulted independent legal authorities, and investigated the financing of amendment campaigns. It should also distinguish verified factual errors from editorial judgments about emphasis and scope. Until that comparison is completed, differences in coverage cannot reliably establish systematic bias, deliberate omission, or coordination with political interests.
The Weber County Hive: Following the Records Others May Overlook
The Weber County Hive brings a different form of journalism into the investigation. Its examination of the 2026 amendments extends beyond the official ballot descriptions and the competing claims of political advocates. It attempts to trace legislative sponsorship, political committees, financial disclosures, and related public records.
That approach is especially relevant to REPRO’s mission because political influence is not always visible in a legislative vote or a campaign slogan. Understanding the relationships among legislators, advocacy organizations, donors, and political committees often requires examining records that receive little attention in ordinary election coverage.
The Hive’s reported findings concerning the Utah Taxpayers Association PAC and Taxpayer Shield PAC provide examples. Its research identifies historical campaign contributions to amendment sponsors and reports an organizational leadership role for Senator Lincoln Fillmore in Taxpayer Shield PAC. Those findings, if confirmed against original state filings, would provide voters with information about political relationships that is relevant to evaluating the campaign surrounding Amendment B.
But investigative reporting is not exempt from verification merely because it examines official records. Transaction dates, reporting periods, committee identities, and the difference between contributions and expenditures must be checked. A historical contribution should not be presented as a payment for a specific legislative action without evidence establishing that connection. An organizational relationship should not be described as unlawful merely because it involves an elected official.
The Hive’s reporting provides documentary leads that warrant independent examination. This investigation attributes the reported financial figures and organizational relationships to The Weber County Hive because REPRO has not yet completed its own reconciliation of the underlying Utah disclosure records. Verification must establish the relevant dates, amounts, committee identities, and reporting periods before stronger conclusions can be drawn. Crediting the original reporting while clearly identifying what remains unverified allows readers to distinguish documented findings from questions requiring further investigation.
There is also a broader question worth pursuing: Why do some aspects of political finance receive relatively little attention in conventional election coverage? The answer may involve limited newsroom resources, editorial priorities, the complexity of disclosure systems, or judgments about what readers find important. It would be premature to assume deliberate suppression. But the practical consequence of limited scrutiny can still be significant if voters remain unaware of relevant relationships.
Political Advertising: Information for Sale
News coverage is only one part of the information environment. Political committees can purchase television advertising, digital messages, mailers, and other forms of communication designed to influence the vote. Unlike independent journalism, political advertising is created to persuade. Its sponsors choose which facts to emphasize, which arguments to simplify, and which emotional responses to encourage.
Federal Communications Commission political files provide a means of examining certain broadcast advertising transactions. Station-file entries identified in the material reviewed for this investigation associate Utahns Protecting Our Constitution with political advertising activity involving KTVX, KUCW, and KSL-TV. However, the underlying orders, invoices, broadcast dates, amounts, and advertisement content have not yet been independently reconciled. These records therefore identify a potentially useful documentary trail, not a verified accounting of the opposition campaign’s advertising expenditures or messages.
Comparable records should be sought for organizations supporting Amendment B, including Taxpayer Shield PAC and any other committees purchasing advertising. State financial disclosures may identify additional vendors and expenditures, while archived advertisements can help determine the claims presented to voters.
The analysis should focus on specific, verifiable questions. Did an advertisement accurately describe the amendment’s legal effect? Did it omit a consequence that materially changed the meaning of the message? Did it identify its sponsor as required? Were claims about tax increases, legislative accountability, or citizen rights supported by the underlying constitutional text?
Political advertising is inherently selective. That alone is not misconduct. The concern arises when selective presentation becomes materially misleading or when required sponsorship and expenditure information is concealed.
When Does Media Bias Become Media Collusion?
The word bias is frequently used to describe coverage that favors one interpretation over another. Bias can arise through story selection, framing, source choices, emphasis, or the omission of relevant context. It can also be alleged unfairly when a reporter accurately describes facts that one side would prefer to minimize.
Collusion is a more serious allegation. It implies some form of coordinated conduct, often concealed, between parties whose relationship matters to the public. A newspaper’s editorial position does not establish collusion with a political committee. A reporter’s use of an advocacy organization’s research does not establish that the reporter is acting under that organization’s direction. Even repeated similarity between political messaging and news coverage may reflect shared sources or widely available facts rather than an improper agreement.
To establish meaningful evidence of media collusion, investigators would need something more concrete: undisclosed financial arrangements, communications demonstrating coordinated messaging, deceptive sponsorship practices, or other records connecting an outlet’s editorial conduct to outside direction.
The material examined for this investigation has not established undisclosed financial arrangements, coordinated editorial direction, or other documentary evidence sufficient to support a finding of media collusion. This is a limitation of the evidence reviewed, not a determination that every relevant relationship or communication has been examined.
That limitation does not make media accountability less important. Journalism can fall short without participating in a conspiracy. A news outlet may fail to investigate a powerful organization, neglect constitutional context, repeat misleading language, or give insufficient attention to the interests financing a campaign. Those failures deserve criticism when supported by a documented review. But the criticism should identify the specific journalistic problem rather than substitute a broad accusation for evidence.
What Was Explained, and What Was Missing?
The most useful next step is a comparative review of actual coverage. For each significant article, broadcast segment, editorial, or advertisement, REPRO should record the date, author or sponsor, format, central claims, sources quoted, and relevant constitutional context. The review should examine whether the coverage accurately distinguished Amendment A’s publication change from Amendment D’s separate ballot-description defect, and whether it explained that Amendment B applies only to specified tax initiatives rather than all citizen initiatives.
The review should also determine whether news coverage clearly distinguished the Legislature’s authority to propose constitutional amendments from its obligation to comply with existing constitutional requirements. Both principles are important. Legislators may lawfully propose changes to the Constitution, including changes affecting government procedures or citizen initiatives. However, the authority to propose an amendment does not excuse failure to comply with the constitutional requirements governing its submission to voters. Whether individual news reports adequately explained that distinction must be determined through examination of their actual content.
Another important measure is whether coverage informed voters about the financial and organizational interests involved. A story may quote the Utah Taxpayers Association as a supporter of Amendment B without exploring its political committee, its funding sources, or its reported relationships with legislators. That may be reasonable in a short news brief. Across an extended election campaign, however, the absence of such examination would leave an important part of the public record unexplored.
The same standard must apply to opponents. Their donors, committee officers, consultants, and advertising expenditures are no less relevant merely because their stated position emphasizes protecting citizen rights.
Only after assembling that comparative record should REPRO assign findings concerning accuracy, omissions, framing, or apparent bias. An allegation of deliberate suppression or coordinated messaging should require independent evidence, not merely the absence of a particular fact from one article.
The Watchdog Test
Utah news organizations have reported important developments in the constitutional amendment debate, including legislative proposals, court decisions, competing political arguments, and redistricting litigation. Independent investigators have also published information concerning financial and organizational relationships that warrant further examination. These contributions are significant, but the reporting identified in this investigation has not yet been subjected to a comprehensive, article-by-article review sufficient to establish the overall completeness or consistency of Utah’s media coverage.
The record therefore does not support a sweeping claim that Utah’s media collectively ignored the controversy or acted as a unified instrument of political power.
But the existence of coverage is not the same as comprehensive accountability. The question is whether citizens received a sufficiently complete picture of the constitutional history, the practical consequences of the amendments, the interests financing the campaigns, and the institutional authority at stake.
A free press is not required to agree with REPRO’s conclusions. It is not required to treat every political claim as equally credible. Its responsibility is to seek and accurately present information of public importance, especially when government officials propose changing the rules under which they exercise power.
The standard applies to REPRO and Utah Standard News as well. We cannot credibly demand transparency from others while failing to identify our own sources, distinguish reporting from commentary, or correct errors when they are discovered.
The most important question is not whether a newspaper supports Amendment A or opposes Amendment B. It is whether voters can understand what their government is asking them to change, who is advocating for that change, and what the consequences may be.
Whether Utah’s news organizations have fully met their responsibility remains an open question requiring systematic review. The standard is clear: accurate reporting, sufficient context, independent scrutiny, and accountability for errors.
But journalists are not the only participants whose responsibilities deserve examination. Legislators exercise constitutional authority under a solemn oath. When they disagree with a judicial interpretation of that authority, what does their oath require of them, and where is the boundary between legitimately seeking constitutional change and disregarding constitutional limits?
Section 10: The Oath of Office and the Constitutional Limits of Government Power
When Elected Officials Disagree With the Constitution They Swore to Uphold
A Promise That Should Mean Something
Every Utah legislator enters office having made a solemn promise to support, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah. It is a familiar ceremony, usually completed in a matter of minutes, but the obligation does not end when the oath is administered. It follows elected officials into committee meetings, legislative sessions, budget negotiations, and every decision in which they exercise the authority entrusted to them by the people.
The oath binds legislators to the constitutional framework within which they exercise governmental power. That framework includes the authority reserved to the people, the powers assigned to the Legislature, and the judiciary’s responsibility to decide constitutional disputes. Legislators may disagree with judicial interpretations and advocate lawful constitutional changes. But disagreement does not itself alter the governing law, and the oath does not authorize officials to disregard constitutional requirements while seeking to change them.
This raises a question that goes beyond the familiar disagreements between Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, or legislative and judicial branches. What happens when elected officials believe the Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, prevents them from exercising authority they think they should possess? Are they obligated to accept that limitation, or may they seek to change it?
The answer is that constitutional government allows both disagreement and lawful change. Legislators may criticize judicial decisions, pursue appeals, and propose constitutional amendments. But until the governing law is changed through legitimate constitutional procedures, they remain bound by the Constitution as it stands.
That distinction is the foundation for evaluating the oath-of-office questions raised by Proposition 4 and the subsequent amendments.
The Constitution Is Not a Grant of Unlimited Authority
There is a persistent temptation in government to treat electoral victory as a broad mandate to do whatever elected officials believe is necessary. Legislators can point to their constituents, their policy expertise, and their responsibility to govern. Those considerations matter. Representative government depends on officials exercising judgment and making decisions that cannot be submitted to a statewide vote every time a disagreement arises.
But winning an election does not place a legislator above the Constitution. The powers of government are defined and limited by the document the people adopted. When that document reserves particular authority to citizens, elected representatives cannot simply assume that their own authority must prevail.
The Proposition 4 litigation brought that principle into direct conflict with legislative practice. Utah voters approved a government reform through the initiative process. The Legislature subsequently replaced central parts of that reform. In July 2024, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the people’s constitutional right to reform government limits the Legislature’s ability to impair such initiatives. In August 2025, the district court applied that standard and found the Legislature’s repeal and replacement of Proposition 4 unconstitutional.
The rulings demonstrate that constitutional limits on legislative authority can be enforced through judicial review. They do not, standing alone, establish that individual legislators knowingly violated their oaths when they supported the challenged legislation. Assessing individual responsibility requires examining what officials knew, the constitutional objections presented to them, their recorded votes and public explanations, and their conduct after the courts clarified the governing legal requirements. A judicial finding that legislation is unconstitutional establishes a legal defect; a conclusion about an official’s knowledge or intent requires additional evidence.
But judicial findings also cannot be dismissed as merely another political opinion. Courts possess the constitutional responsibility to decide cases and determine whether government actions comply with governing law. When a court finds a statute unconstitutional, the ruling carries legal consequences that public officials must respect, subject to the ordinary processes of appeal and further review.
The question for accountability is therefore not simply whether lawmakers lost a constitutional case. It is how they responded to the limits identified by the courts, whether subsequent actions complied with those limits, and whether their public explanations accurately described the constitutional rights involved.
The Difference Between Changing the Law and Evading It
The Legislature’s response to the Supreme Court’s July 2024 decision illustrates the importance of distinguishing lawful constitutional change from unconstitutional government action. After the court recognized protections for citizen-enacted government reforms, legislative leaders proposed Amendment D to expand their authority to amend or repeal those reforms. They were entitled to propose that change. Article XXIII of the Utah Constitution provides a process through which legislators may submit constitutional amendments to voters.
But the authority to propose an amendment does not include authority to disregard the procedures governing its submission.
In October 2024, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that Amendment D had not been properly submitted to voters. The official ballot description failed to adequately disclose that the proposal would remove constitutional restrictions on legislative interference with government-reform initiatives. The required newspaper publication also had not occurred.
The court’s findings established failures to comply with constitutional requirements governing the submission of Amendment D. They did not establish that individual legislators intentionally deceived voters or knowingly violated their oaths of office. Those questions require separate examination of responsibility, knowledge, and documented conduct. The constitutional defects identified by the court remain significant regardless of whether intentional misconduct can be established.
The court’s ruling was serious enough without embellishment. It meant that the Legislature had attempted to submit a constitutional change affecting the people’s reserved authority, but had failed to comply with safeguards designed to ensure that voters were properly informed.
Can Lawmakers Change the Rules That Restrict Them?
This question lies at the center of the broader investigation. When a constitutional safeguard limits legislative authority, lawmakers may believe the safeguard is outdated, impractical, or based on an incorrect judicial interpretation. The amendment process exists partly so that citizens can reconsider such arrangements.
A proposed constitutional amendment may arise from a genuine policy concern, disagreement with a judicial interpretation, a desire to alter the balance of governmental authority, or some combination of these considerations. The Legislature has the authority to propose changes through the prescribed constitutional process, but the public is entitled to examine the timing, stated reasons, practical consequences, and interests supporting each proposal. Those facts provide a more reliable basis for evaluating legislative conduct than assumptions about lawmakers’ motives.
Amendment A provides an example. Its sponsors argue that mandatory newspaper publication should be replaced with modern notice methods established by statute. That argument has practical merit. Electronic publication may reach citizens more effectively than newspaper notices, and a Constitution should not necessarily require obsolete technology.
Yet the timing is relevant. The Supreme Court had recently enforced the newspaper-publication requirement against Amendment D. The Legislature then proposed changing that requirement. Whether the amendment represents a sound modernization or an undesirable transfer of control over constitutional notice procedures depends on the details of the new system, the safeguards it retains, and the reasons offered for the change.
Amendment B presents a different issue. Its sponsors argue that certain citizen-initiated tax increases should require broader public agreement. Opponents argue that the higher threshold would restrict the people’s reserved legislative authority without imposing an equivalent statewide approval requirement on ordinary legislative tax measures. The proposal does not directly overturn the Proposition 4 ruling, and its tax-specific purpose should not be confused with the Legislature’s separate effort to restore broader authority over government-reform initiatives.
Neither amendment becomes an oath violation merely because it would change a constitutional protection or procedure. The people possess the ultimate authority to approve or reject proposed constitutional changes. The question is whether lawmakers have accurately explained what they are asking the people to surrender, retain, or modify.
The Legislature, the Courts, and the Separation of Powers
The continuing disagreement between Utah legislative leaders and the judiciary has generated strong public statements about the proper role of each branch of government. Senate President Stuart Adams, House Speaker Mike Schultz, and Senate Majority Leader Kirk Cullimore have publicly disputed the court’s interpretation of initiative power and discussed the possibility of another constitutional amendment addressing that issue.
Such disagreements are not inherently improper. The separation of powers anticipates that branches of government will sometimes disagree about the scope of their authority. Legislators can argue that courts have interpreted the Constitution incorrectly, just as courts can conclude that legislation exceeds constitutional limits.
The critical distinction is between challenging a judicial ruling through lawful procedures and disregarding binding legal requirements. Public officials may criticize court decisions, pursue available appeals, request reconsideration, and propose constitutional amendments through the prescribed process. Those actions are legitimate features of constitutional government. However, disagreement with a judicial interpretation does not, by itself, suspend an enforceable court order or eliminate existing constitutional obligations. Whether any particular official failed to comply with a binding requirement must be established through documented conduct, not inferred from public criticism of the judiciary.
Nor should the courts be treated as infallible. Judicial decisions can be criticized, appealed, distinguished, and, where the Constitution permits, superseded by properly adopted amendments. The judiciary’s legitimacy rests on faithfully applying the law, not on being beyond public examination.
But the courts’ willingness to enforce constitutional limits against legislative leadership is a relevant part of this story. In the Proposition 4 and Amendment D cases, judicial decisions restrained legislative actions. Those decisions provide documented examples of checks and balances operating within Utah’s government, even amid substantial political disagreement.
When Does an Oath Become an Accountability Issue?
An oath-of-office investigation must be more rigorous than a political argument. It should begin with the actual constitutional obligation, identify the official conduct being examined, and determine whether a court or other competent authority has found that conduct unlawful. It should then consider the official’s knowledge, public explanations, legal advice, opportunities to correct the problem, and response after the constitutional requirements were clarified.
Those distinctions can produce very different conclusions. A legislator who votes for a bill later declared unconstitutional may have acted in good faith under an interpretation ultimately rejected by the courts. An official who knowingly disregards a clear constitutional command after receiving authoritative notice presents a different accountability question. Deliberately concealing a proposal’s legal consequences would raise still more serious concerns, but intent must be established through evidence rather than inferred from an unfavorable court ruling.
The Utah Supreme Court’s Amendment D decision established that the proposal had not been submitted in compliance with constitutional requirements governing the ballot description and publication process. That ruling provides a documented basis for examining the responsibilities of the officials and institutions involved. A complete accountability review should identify who possessed the relevant duties, what warnings or legal advice they received, what decisions they made, and how they responded when the constitutional defects became apparent. The evidence examined in this report does not establish that any named legislator deliberately violated the oath of office. That question requires proof of individual conduct and knowledge, not merely association with an unsuccessful constitutional amendment.
That is not an attempt to excuse constitutional failures. It is an insistence that accountability be based on proof.
There is also a broader form of accountability that does not depend on proving an oath violation. Voters are entitled to evaluate whether their representatives consistently respect the constitutional rights of citizens, accurately describe proposed changes, acknowledge mistakes, and accept responsibility when government actions fail judicial review. An official may avoid a legal finding of misconduct while still facing legitimate criticism for poor judgment, inadequate transparency, or disregard for the practical consequences of a proposal.
Who Watches the People Who Make the Rules?
The framers of constitutional government understood that power must be restrained because those who exercise it are human. Officials may be principled, ambitious, cautious, self-interested, or some combination of those qualities. Institutions develop habits and priorities of their own. A Legislature may come to view restrictions on its authority as obstacles to effective government, while citizens may view those same restrictions as essential protections against concentrated power.
Neither perspective should be accepted without examination.
The oath of office is one safeguard. Judicial review is another. Public disclosure, elections, citizen initiatives, and an independent press provide additional means of accountability. Each serves a different function, and none is sufficient by itself.
A recurring question in constitutional government is whether proposed changes serve a demonstrable public purpose, expand institutional discretion, or accomplish both. That question becomes especially important when proposals follow judicial decisions enforcing limits on governmental authority. The timing and effects of such proposals warrant scrutiny, but neither their sequence nor their consequences, standing alone, establish that officials acted to evade constitutional restraints. Determining purpose and responsibility requires examination of legislative records, public explanations, drafting history, and documented conduct.
Utah’s recent history presents enough documented conflict to warrant that examination. The Legislature altered voter-approved redistricting reforms, defended its actions in court, pursued Amendment D, and subsequently proposed changes to constitutional publication procedures and initiative voting thresholds. These measures are not identical, and they do not establish a concealed conspiracy. But they place the relationship between constitutional authority and institutional self-interest squarely before the public.
The Standard We Should Expect
The people of Utah should not have to prove that their elected officials are corrupt before demanding respect for constitutional limits. Nor should legislators be accused of violating their oaths simply because they disagree with a judicial interpretation or support an amendment that changes existing law.
The proper standard is both simpler and more demanding: Government officials should act within their lawful authority, comply with constitutional procedures, accurately explain proposed changes, and remain accountable for the consequences of their decisions.
When a court identifies a constitutional violation, public officials should comply with applicable orders while retaining their lawful rights to seek review or propose constitutional changes. When legislators ask voters to amend the Constitution, they should clearly explain the proposed change, its practical consequences, and the reasons supporting it. When political organizations finance campaigns surrounding those proposals, their contributions and expenditures should be disclosed as required by law. And when journalists report on the controversy, they should distinguish established constitutional facts, competing legal interpretations, and political advocacy.
Those expectations are not radical. They are the ordinary requirements of a government whose authority comes from the people.
The oath of office does not require legislators to surrender their judgment. It requires them to exercise that judgment within the Constitution they promised to uphold.
Whether Utah’s elected officials have consistently honored that responsibility is a question citizens are entitled to ask. The evidence assembled in this investigation provides grounds for serious scrutiny, but final judgments about individual misconduct must rest on documented actions and applicable legal standards.
The ultimate responsibility belongs to the people. They must decide whether the constitutional changes proposed in their name preserve the proper balance of authority or shift it in ways they do not wish to accept.
And that brings us to the final chapter of this investigation: what the evidence establishes, what remains unanswered, and what Utah voters should consider before making their decision.
Section 11: The Verdict of the Evidence
What Utah Voters Deserve to Know
The Question That Started It All
This investigation began with a question about the relationship between the people of Utah and the government they created. The evidence reveals more than a disagreement over redistricting, public notice, or taxation. It documents a continuing constitutional struggle involving citizen initiatives, legislative authority, judicial enforcement, political advocacy, and the information available to voters. At its center is a fundamental question: Who ultimately controls the powers that Utah’s Constitution reserves to the people?
The central question is no longer whether that struggle exists. The record establishes that it does. The question is what the documented actions reveal about the exercise of political power, and what remains unproven.
The Constitution supplies the foundational answer. Article I, Section 2 declares that political power is inherent in the people. Article VI reserves to them the power of initiative and referendum. Those provisions do not eliminate representative government, nor do they make every citizen initiative immune from legislative revision. But they establish that the Legislature’s authority exists within a constitutional framework created by the people, not above it.
The events examined in this report demonstrate why that distinction matters. Government officials may sincerely believe that broader legislative authority produces better public policy. Citizens may sincerely believe that direct democracy provides an essential restraint on political institutions. The Constitution determines how those competing powers are exercised, and the courts are responsible for resolving disputes about its meaning.
What the Evidence Establishes
The most important finding is not a theory about hidden influence. It is a documented history of conflict over constitutional authority.
Utah voters approved Proposition 4 in 2018. The Legislature repealed and replaced its statutory framework in 2020, and in 2021 adopted congressional boundaries that became the subject of litigation. In July 2024, the Utah Supreme Court recognized constitutional protections for government reforms enacted through citizen initiatives. The court did not declare that such initiatives could never be changed. It held that legislative changes impairing protected government reforms must satisfy a demanding constitutional standard.
In August 2024, following the Utah Supreme Court’s ruling on citizen-enacted government reforms, the Legislature proposed Amendment D. The amendment would have expanded legislative authority to amend or repeal voter-enacted laws, including government-reform initiatives protected by the court’s interpretation of the existing Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court subsequently ruled that Amendment D had not been properly submitted to voters. The court identified two independent constitutional defects: the ballot description did not adequately communicate the proposal’s effect on legislative power, and the required newspaper publication had not occurred. As a result, the amendment could not take effect through the 2024 election.
Those findings are significant. They establish that the Legislature sought a constitutional change affecting the people’s reserved authority and failed to comply with the requirements governing its submission. They do not establish that every legislator who supported Amendment D acted dishonestly or deliberately violated an oath.
The dispute continued. In August 2025, the district court applied the Supreme Court’s constitutional standard and ruled that the Legislature’s repeal and replacement of Proposition 4 violated the Utah Constitution. Additional litigation followed, while legislative leaders continued publicly disputing the court’s interpretation and discussing further constitutional changes.
This sequence demonstrates an enduring institutional disagreement. It also demonstrates that constitutional checks have operated against the Legislature when courts found its actions inconsistent with governing requirements.
What Amendments A and B Would Actually Do
Amendments A and B are part of the political environment created by these disputes, but they are not identical to Amendment D and should not be presented as though they accomplish the same thing.
Amendment A would change the constitutional requirement governing publication of proposed constitutional amendments. Instead of specifying newspaper publication, the Constitution would require at least 60 days of publication through a method established by statute. Supporters argue that the change would modernize public notice and make better use of electronic information systems. Critics question whether transferring control of the publication method to ordinary legislation would weaken a safeguard that recently played a role in preventing Amendment D from taking effect.
Both consequences deserve attention. Amendment A would retain a constitutional requirement for public notice and would not eliminate the separate obligation to provide an accurate ballot description. Its principal change would be to remove the Constitution’s specific newspaper-publication requirement and authorize the Legislature to establish the publication method by statute, subject to the amendment’s minimum 60-day notice requirement. This would provide flexibility to modernize public notice while also allowing future legislatures to change the publication method through ordinary legislation rather than another constitutional amendment.
Amendment B would require 60% voter approval for certain statewide citizen initiatives involving taxes. Supporters contend that tax increases should require broader public agreement because they impose costs on citizens who may oppose them. Opponents argue that the proposal would create a higher hurdle for citizens exercising their initiative power without imposing an equivalent statewide approval requirement on ordinary tax legislation passed by the Legislature.
Again, the distinction matters. Amendment B would not apply to all initiatives, and it would not directly overturn Proposition 4. It would establish a special approval threshold for specified tax-related initiatives, potentially preventing measures supported by a majority of voters from becoming law if they received less than 60% support.
Neither amendment can be evaluated responsibly through slogans alone. Each changes a constitutional rule, and the consequences of those changes may continue long after the current legislators and campaign organizations have left the political scene.
The People, the Organizations, and the Money
Our investigation has identified legislators, legislative leaders, advocacy organizations, and political committees involved in the amendment debates. Some of their relationships are obvious and publicly acknowledged. Others require closer examination through financial disclosures, legislative records, and organizational filings.
The Utah Taxpayers Association has supported Amendment B, and The Weber County Hive has reported historical campaign contributions from its political action committee to legislators associated with the amendments. The Hive has also identified an organizational connection between Senator Lincoln Fillmore, Amendment B’s principal sponsor, and Taxpayer Shield PAC, a committee supporting the proposal.
The reported contributions and organizational relationships remain subject to independent verification against original Utah campaign-finance disclosures and committee filings. The information examined so far identifies specific relationships and investigative leads, but it does not establish that financial support was exchanged for legislative action or that political committees exercised improper control over amendment sponsors. Assessing those questions requires verified transaction dates, organizational records, communications, and evidence connecting financial activity to particular decisions.
The same investigative standards must apply to organizations opposing the amendments. Their financial supporters, advertising expenditures, consultants, and organizational relationships are relevant to understanding the public campaign.
What matters is not whether money exists in politics. Everyone knows it does. What matters is whether voters can identify the interests financing constitutional campaigns and whether the available evidence establishes anything beyond ordinary political support.
At present, the record supports scrutiny of identifiable relationships. It does not support a definitive accusation that Amendments A and B were purchased, secretly directed, or advanced through corrupt arrangements.
The Media’s Responsibility
The media have also influenced how Utahns understand these constitutional disputes. Utah News Dispatch has followed the legislative and judicial conflicts over initiative power. KUER has provided election explanations. The Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret News, KSL, and other outlets have reported on the amendments and published competing perspectives. The Weber County Hive has pursued financial and organizational records that deserve additional verification.
That coverage has informed the public, but the investigation also raises questions about whether voters have consistently received the larger constitutional context. An article may accurately explain Amendment B’s 60% requirement without discussing the Legislature’s earlier conflicts over initiative power. A report may describe Amendment A as modernizing public notice without examining the significance of the publication requirement enforced against Amendment D. A campaign story may quote advocacy organizations without exploring their financial relationships.
Gaps in coverage, selective emphasis, and editorial positions warrant examination, particularly when they recur across significant constitutional disputes. Such patterns may provide evidence of editorial bias, but establishing deliberate suppression or improper coordination requires additional documentation. This investigation has not yet completed a systematic comparison of Utah media coverage or examined all available evidence concerning relationships between political institutions and news organizations. Consequently, the present findings should not be interpreted as either proof of collusion or a determination that collusion did not occur.
Nevertheless, constitutional changes deserve unusually careful coverage. The public should not have to assemble the entire history from scattered court opinions, legislative records, campaign advertisements, and brief election explainers to understand what is being proposed.
The responsibility of a free press is not to tell voters what to think. It is to give them enough accurate information to think for themselves.
That is also the responsibility of this investigation.
Is There a Deep State in Utah?
The investigation raises a provocative question: Does Utah possess an entrenched network of political, financial, and institutional influence operating beyond meaningful public accountability?
It is a question, not a verdict.
The term deep state can suggest an entrenched network of political, financial, and institutional interests exercising influence beyond meaningful public accountability. Used carelessly, it can become a substitute for evidence, implying hidden wrongdoing whenever officials share political objectives or organizations maintain relationships with government.
The record examined here establishes the existence of powerful institutions, recurring political alliances, and a sustained struggle over constitutional authority. It identifies lawmakers who have sought greater legislative discretion, organizations financing public advocacy, and constitutional changes that would affect the people’s reserved powers. Those facts justify continued investigation into influence and accountability.
They do not yet establish a concealed command structure, an unlawful agreement among amendment sponsors, or a coordinated scheme involving the courts and media.
There is an important difference between an influential political establishment and a secret organization exercising improper control. The former is a recognizable feature of political life. The latter is a serious allegation requiring direct and credible evidence.
The distinction is essential to determining whether Utah’s documented political relationships reflect ordinary institutional influence, improper coordination, or something more deeply entrenched. The evidence must determine which explanation is supported.
If further records reveal improper arrangements, they should be reported with the supporting documentation. If they do not, the absence of such evidence must be acknowledged.
The credibility of this investigation depends on following the evidence wherever it leads, including when the findings are less dramatic than the suspicions that prompted the inquiry.
What Remains Unanswered
Several important questions remain open.
We have not yet independently reconciled all reported campaign contributions and committee expenditures against the original disclosure records. The complete financial activity of the organizations supporting and opposing Amendment B requires further review. The legislative drafting histories and communications surrounding Amendments A and B may clarify how the proposals originated and whether particular organizations participated in developing their language.
The sponsors and legislative leaders should also have an opportunity to respond directly to questions about their objectives, the constitutional consequences of their proposals, and their relationships with political advocacy organizations. Their explanations should be presented accurately, including any documents they provide that challenge or clarify our findings.
A complete media accountability review also remains unfinished. The reporting, editorials, and political commentary of major Utah news organizations require systematic comparison, with particular attention to factual accuracy, constitutional context, significant omissions, sourcing, and financial or organizational relationships. Additional documentary evidence concerning The Salt Lake Tribune, including material identified in Wayne Wickizer’s petition involving Governor Spencer Cox, has been identified for future examination but has not yet been evaluated in this report. Any findings of recurring editorial bias, deliberate suppression, or improper coordination must rest on verified evidence rather than assumptions about political alignment.
These are not minor editorial details. They determine whether the final report can make stronger findings about political influence or must leave particular questions unresolved.
An unanswered question is not proof of wrongdoing. But neither should an important question be abandoned merely because the first round of research does not produce a definitive answer.
What Voters Should Consider
The Republic Project is not endorsing or opposing either amendment. Our purpose is to explain what voters are being asked to change and why the history matters.
On Amendment A, the central question is whether the advantages of modernizing constitutional publication procedures justify allowing the Legislature to determine the publication method through ordinary law. Voters should consider the accessibility and reliability of electronic notice, the constitutional safeguards that remain, and the consequences of transferring control over publication procedures.
On Amendment B, the central question is whether certain citizen-initiated tax measures should require a 60% majority when ordinary legislative tax measures do not face an equivalent statewide popular-vote requirement. Voters should weigh the value of broader agreement before imposing taxes against the importance of preserving the people’s ability to legislate directly by majority vote.
Neither question can be answered solely by looking at the personalities involved or the organizations financing the campaigns. The constitutional consequences must stand on their own.
The history surrounding these proposals also deserves examination. Legislative actions, judicial decisions, advocacy campaigns, and documented political relationships provide context for understanding how the amendments developed and whose interests may be affected. Voters can consider that history alongside the actual constitutional language, the arguments offered by supporters and opponents, and the practical consequences of approval or rejection. The distinction between established facts, competing interpretations, and unanswered investigative questions remains essential.
The Final Question
The history of Proposition 4, Amendment D, and Amendments A and B reveals something larger than a dispute over redistricting, newspaper notices, or taxes. It reveals a continuing tension between the authority of elected representatives and the powers the people reserved for themselves.
That tension is not necessarily a defect in constitutional government. It is part of the reason constitutions exist. They establish boundaries, distribute authority, and provide methods for resolving disputes when different institutions claim the power to act.
The danger arises when those boundaries become difficult for ordinary citizens to understand, when constitutional changes are presented without adequate explanation, or when political institutions treat public consent as a formality rather than the foundation of their authority.
Utah’s Constitution begins by declaring that political power belongs to the people. That declaration does not guarantee that every citizen initiative is wise, every legislative decision is wrong, or every court ruling is beyond criticism. It establishes something more fundamental: Government is accountable to the people whose authority it exercises.
The Legislature may propose changes. The courts may enforce constitutional limits. Advocacy organizations may argue for their preferred outcomes. The press may investigate, criticize, and explain.
But none of them owns the Constitution.
The Constitution belongs to the people.
And when the people are asked to change it, they deserve the whole story.
SECTION 12
Questions to Principal Actors and Organizations
An Opportunity to Respond to the Documentary Record
The Republic Project believes that individuals and organizations whose actions are examined in an investigative report should have a meaningful opportunity to explain their decisions, correct factual errors, and provide relevant documentation.
The questions below arise from the constitutional disputes, legislative actions, political relationships, financial reporting, and public messaging examined in this investigation.
They are not accusations or findings of misconduct. Their purpose is to clarify the record and ensure that relevant perspectives are considered before publication.
Each recipient will be invited to provide written responses, supporting documents, and any corrections they believe are warranted. Substantive responses will be fairly represented in the final report, subject to reasonable editorial considerations.
Editorial record: For each recipient, The Republic Project will record the date of inquiry, response deadline, date of response, and publication status. A lack of response will not be represented as an admission or evidence of wrongdoing.
Email introduction sent to all recipients:
Dear [Name],
The Republic Project is completing a comprehensive investigative report titled “The Story Behind the Amendments: An Investigation Into Utah’s Constitutional Power Structure.”
The investigation examines the constitutional, legislative, political, and financial circumstances surrounding Proposition 4, Amendment D, and the proposed Amendments A and B appearing on Utah’s November 3, 2026 ballot.
Our objective is to provide Utah voters with an accurate, documented account of how these measures originated, who participated in their development, the interests involved, and their potential consequences for the constitutional balance of power between the people and their elected representatives.
Because you or your organization have a relevant role in the matters examined, we believe it is important to provide an opportunity to explain your position, clarify the public record, and correct any factual misunderstandings before publication.
We have prepared several questions specifically related to your involvement or area of responsibility, included below. We welcome your written responses, supporting documentation, and any additional information you believe the public should consider.
Because this investigation concerns constitutional amendments appearing on Utah’s November 3 ballot, publication is scheduled for October 22, 2026.
We respectfully request your written response by 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time on Wednesday, October 21, 2026, so that your comments and any supporting documentation can be considered before publication.
We recognize the limited timeframe and welcome an acknowledgment of receipt, preliminary response, or request for additional time. Substantive information received after the deadline will also be considered for appropriate corrections or updates.
Our commitment is to factual accuracy, fairness, and constitutional accountability. Your responses will be carefully considered and fairly represented in the final report.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
Ed Wallace
The Republic Project https://republicstratagems.com/
Defending the Republic with Oversight, Accountability, and Action.
Utah Standard News
https://www.utahstandardnews.com
12.1 Senator Stuart Adams
jsadams@le.utah.gov
Subject: Legislative leadership, Proposition 4, and Amendment D
- Following the Utah Supreme Court’s July 2024 decision concerning Proposition 4, what was your understanding of the constitutional limits on the Legislature’s authority to amend voter-approved government reforms?
- What role did you play in developing, approving, or advancing Amendment D?
- Who was responsible for reviewing the accuracy of Amendment D’s official ballot description, and what review procedures were followed?
- What steps did legislative leadership take to ensure compliance with the constitutional newspaper-publication requirement?
- Following the judicial invalidation of Amendment D, what changes, if any, did legislative leadership make to its constitutional review and public-notice procedures?
- Do you believe Amendments A and B are connected to the broader conflict over citizen initiatives? Please explain your position.
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response received: October 20, 5:21 p.m
Response from Utah Senate Deputy Chief of Staff: Sent by Aundrea Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Utah Senate : “Ed, Thanks for reaching out. Amendment D was a proposal from 2024 and is not on this year’s ballot. Regarding your question about Amendments A and B, each presents voters with a distinct policy decision and should be evaluated on its own. The voter information pamphlet has analyses of Amendments A and B, along with arguments for from the sponsors.
- Amendment A: pages 36-39
- Amendment B: pages 40-45”
Editorial Note: Peterson clarified that Amendment D was a 2024 proposal and is not on the 2026 ballot. She stated that Amendments A and B present distinct policy decisions that should be evaluated individually and referred readers to the official Utah Voter Information Pamphlet for the sponsors’ arguments.
Editorial observation: The response did not directly address the specific constitutional questions submitted concerning legislative authority, citizen participation, or the justification for differing voting thresholds.
An email was also sent to Mark Thomas mthomas@le.utah.gov & amusselman@le.utah.gov “I am directing this inquiry to your office to ensure that the appropriate legislative officials have an opportunity to respond. Please forward the attached questions to the relevant members of legislative leadership and advise whether your office will coordinate a response or whether individual officials will respond directly.“
12.2 House Speaker Mike Schultz
mikeschultz@le.utah.gov
Subject: House leadership and constitutional amendment procedures
- What role did House leadership play in reviewing and advancing Amendment D?
- How did House leadership evaluate whether the ballot description accurately explained the proposed change to legislative authority over citizen initiatives?
- What procedures were in place to confirm compliance with constitutional publication requirements?
- How did the court’s decision concerning Amendment D influence the House’s consideration of Amendment A?
- What safeguards do you believe should prevent future proposed constitutional amendments from reaching voters with incomplete or misleading descriptions?
- What responsibility does legislative leadership bear when a proposed amendment is invalidated for failure to satisfy constitutional submission requirements?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
An email was also sent to Utah House media office, Alexa Musselman amusselman@le.utah.gov “I am directing this inquiry to your office to ensure that the appropriate legislative officials have an opportunity to respond. Please forward the attached questions to the relevant members of legislative leadership and advise whether your office will coordinate a response or whether individual officials will respond directly.“ No Response Received
12.3 Senator Kirk Cullimore
kcullimore@le.utah.gov
Subject: Legislative authority and citizen-initiated government reform
- How do you interpret the Utah Supreme Court’s recognition of constitutional protections for qualifying citizen-enacted government reforms?
- In your view, what limits should apply to legislative changes to voter-approved initiatives?
- What role, if any, did you have in developing legislative responses to the Proposition 4 litigation or the court’s 2024 ruling?
- What was your involvement, if any, in the development or advancement of Amendment D?
- Do you support further constitutional changes concerning the Legislature’s authority over citizen initiatives? If so, what changes and why?
- How should voters distinguish legitimate legislative disagreement with a court decision from efforts to weaken constitutional protections recognized by that decision?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.4 Representative Anthony Loubet
aloubet@le.utah.gov
Subject: Amendment A and constitutional publication safeguards
- What problem prompted you to sponsor Amendment A?
- When was the proposal first developed, and who participated in its drafting?
- Was Amendment A proposed in response, in whole or in part, to the judicial invalidation of Amendment D?
- Why should the method of publishing proposed constitutional amendments be determined by statute rather than specified in the Constitution?
- What safeguards would prevent a future Legislature from adopting a publication method that provides inadequate notice to voters?
- What organizations or outside individuals, if any, helped develop or advocate for Amendment A?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.5 Senator Daniel McCay
dmccay@le.utah.gov
Subject: Amendment A, constitutional procedure, and public notice
- What was your role in developing and advancing Amendment A?
- How did the court’s findings concerning Amendment D’s publication failures influence the proposal?
- What specific deficiencies in the existing newspaper-publication requirement does Amendment A address?
- What protections would remain if future lawmakers changed the statutory publication procedures?
- What measures would ensure that Utahns without reliable internet access receive adequate notice of proposed constitutional amendments?
- Were any outside organizations involved in drafting, reviewing, or promoting Amendment A? If so, what roles did they play?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.6 Senator Lincoln Fillmore
lfillmore@le.utah.gov
Subject: Amendment B, the 60% threshold, and political committee relationships
- What evidence led you to conclude that the specified citizen-initiated tax measures should require 60% voter approval rather than a simple majority?
- Why should the proposed higher voter-approval threshold apply to qualifying citizen initiatives without imposing an equivalent voter-approval requirement on ordinary legislative tax measures?
- What alternatives were considered before selecting the 60% threshold?
- What role did the Utah Taxpayers Association or other outside organizations play in developing or promoting Amendment B?
- Public reporting identifies you as chairman of Taxpayer Shield PAC. Can you confirm your role, describe your responsibilities, and explain the organization’s relationship to the Amendment B campaign?
- What measures are in place to ensure accurate disclosure of campaign financing, organizational expenditures, and any coordination involving your legislative or campaign activities?
- Are the reported Utah Taxpayers Association PAC contributions to your campaign accurate, and is there any additional context or documentation you would like included?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.7 Representative Jason Kyle
jkyle@le.utah.gov
Subject: Amendment B and the rationale for unequal approval thresholds
- What constitutional or public-policy concern prompted your support for Amendment B?
- Why is a 60% approval threshold appropriate for the specified citizen-initiated tax measures?
- How do you respond to concerns that the proposal creates a higher barrier for citizens than the procedures governing ordinary legislative tax measures?
- What role did outside advocacy organizations or political committees play in drafting or promoting the amendment?
- What evidence supports the claim that the proposed threshold would improve taxpayer protection?
- Can you confirm the accuracy of reported Utah Taxpayers Association PAC contributions to your campaign and provide any relevant context?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.8 Utah Taxpayers Association
billy@utahtaxpayers.org
Subject: Advocacy, campaign financing, and Amendment B
- What is the association’s position on Amendment B, and what evidence supports that position?
- Did the association participate in drafting, reviewing, or recommending language for Amendment B?
- What financial or organizational support has the association provided for efforts to promote the amendment?
- Can the association confirm the campaign contributions attributed to its PAC in reporting by The Weber County Hive, including the amounts and dates?
- What relationship, if any, exists between the association and Taxpayer Shield PAC, including overlapping personnel, funding, consultants, or campaign activities?
- What policies govern the association’s interactions with legislators who sponsor measures the association supports?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.9a Questions for Billy Hesterman
billy@utahtaxpayers.org
Subject: Utah Taxpayers Association PAC, Taxpayer SHIELD PAC, and Amendment B
Official Statements of Organization filed with the Utah Lieutenant Governor’s Office identify you as president and treasurer of the Utah Taxpayers Association PAC and as a governing board member of Taxpayer SHIELD PAC.
- Taxpayer SHIELD PAC, official disclosure record
- Utah Taxpayers Association PAC, official disclosure record
We would appreciate your responses to the following questions:
- What are your responsibilities within each political action committee, and when did your involvement with Taxpayer SHIELD PAC begin?
- What organizational, financial, administrative, or strategic relationships exist between the Utah Taxpayers Association PAC and Taxpayer SHIELD PAC?
- Do the two committees share personnel, consultants, donors, fundraising activities, campaign resources, or strategic planning? If so, please describe those arrangements.
- What role, if any, did you personally or either organization play in developing, promoting, or financing Amendment B?
- What communications or consultations, if any, occurred between you, either PAC, Senator Lincoln Fillmore, or Representative Jason Kyle concerning Amendment B?
- How are decisions concerning political contributions, expenditures, and legislative advocacy made within each organization? What role do you personally exercise in those decisions?
- What procedures are used to maintain accurate financial disclosures and comply with applicable campaign-finance requirements?
- Are there additional records, explanations, or circumstances you believe should be considered when evaluating these organizational relationships and their involvement in Amendment B?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.9 Taxpayer Shield PAC
An email was sent to the listed principles at Taxpayer SHIELD PAC, official disclosure record
Brian@BCRPolitical.com, billy@utahtaxpayers.org, lincolnfillmore@gmail.com, and rustycannon801@gmail.com
Subject: Organization, governance, financing, and Amendment B
Questions directed to the organization’s authorized representative, with copies as appropriate to its reported officers.
- Please confirm the PAC’s formation date, current officers, board members, and organizational purpose.
- Is supporting Amendment B among the PAC’s principal objectives?
- What responsibilities does Senator Lincoln Fillmore hold within the organization?
- What financial contributions, loans, expenditures, or in-kind assistance has the PAC received or provided in connection with Amendment B?
- What relationships exist between the PAC, the Utah Taxpayers Association, individual legislators, and outside campaign consultants?
- What procedures govern campaign-finance disclosures and compliance with applicable rules concerning coordinated expenditures?
- Will the PAC provide copies of its organizing documents and relevant financial disclosures?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.10 Utah Lieutenant Governor’s Office
An email was sent to the the following individuals identified for their respective roles:
ryancowley@utah.gov – Elections Director, along with a cc to:
aiverson@utah.gov – Amy Iverson, communications, and
bmauch1@utah.gov – financial disclosures
Subject: Election administration, ballot descriptions, and public notice
- What responsibilities did the office hold concerning the official description and publication of Amendment D?
- How did the office determine that the constitutional publication requirements had been satisfied, or identify that they had not?
- What procedural changes followed the courts’ decisions concerning Amendment D?
- How would Amendment A change the office’s responsibilities for public notice of proposed constitutional amendments?
- What safeguards are in place to ensure that official ballot descriptions accurately explain the legal effects of proposed constitutional amendments?
- Will the office provide the relevant publication records, procedural guidance, and communications necessary to clarify it
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.11 Questions for Elizabeth Rasmussen, Better Boundaries
info@betterboundaries.org
Subject: Proposition 4, redistricting litigation, and citizen initiative rights
- What was Better Boundaries’ original objective in sponsoring Proposition 4, and how did the Legislature’s subsequent actions affect the initiative’s intended protections?
- What evidence does Better Boundaries consider most significant in establishing whether the Legislature’s changes to Proposition 4 undermined the voters’ original intent?
- How do you interpret the Utah Supreme Court’s 2024 decision recognizing constitutional protections for qualifying citizen-enacted government reforms?
- What role did Better Boundaries play in opposing Amendment D, and what concerns did the organization identify regarding its proposed constitutional changes and ballot description?
- Does Better Boundaries view proposed Amendments A and B as related to the continuing dispute over citizen initiative authority? If so, what specific evidence supports that connection?
- What concerns, if any, does Better Boundaries have about transferring constitutional amendment publication requirements from the Constitution to procedures established by statute?
- Does Better Boundaries believe Amendment B’s proposed 60% approval requirement for specified tax-related initiatives could establish a precedent for additional restrictions on citizen initiatives?
- What communications, meetings, or other records can Better Boundaries provide that would help establish the chronology of legislative responses to Proposition 4 and the subsequent court rulings?
- What facts or perspectives do you believe have been overlooked or inaccurately represented in public coverage of these constitutional disputes?
- What do you consider the most important information Utah voters should understand before voting on Amendments A and B?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
12.12 Questions for Alliance for a Better Utah
press@betterutah.org
Subject: Constitutional amendments, government accountability, and public advocacy
- What is Alliance for a Better Utah’s position on Amendments A and B, and what constitutional or public-policy considerations support those positions?
- What role, if any, did your organization play in public advocacy, coalition-building, litigation support, or voter education concerning Proposition 4 and Amendment D?
- How does your organization interpret the Utah Supreme Court’s 2024 decisions concerning citizen initiative rights and the constitutional requirements for submitting amendments to voters?
- Does your organization believe Amendments A and B are independent policy proposals, or do you see them as part of a broader legislative response to the Proposition 4 litigation? What evidence supports your assessment?
- What safeguards do you believe are necessary to ensure that proposed constitutional amendments are accurately described and adequately publicized before elections?
- Does your organization believe the 60% voter-approval threshold proposed by Amendment B creates an imbalance between the initiative powers reserved to citizens and the Legislature’s own authority?
- Has Alliance for a Better Utah coordinated public messaging, research, campaign activities, or financial support with Better Boundaries, Utahns Protecting Our Constitution, or other organizations concerning these amendments? If so, please describe the nature and extent of that cooperation.
- Has your organization received or provided funding specifically intended to influence public opinion or voting on Amendments A or B? If so, what disclosures or documentation are publicly available?
- What concerns does your organization have about the role of campaign financing, political committees, or special-interest organizations in the development and promotion of constitutional amendments?
- What documents, public records, or additional information would you recommend that our investigation examine before publication?
Inquiry sent: October 16, 2026
Response requested by: October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT
Response status: No response received by October 22, 2026, 5:00 p.m. MDT.
The Republic Project
Defending the Republic with Oversight, Accountability, and Action.
Prepared in association with Utah Standard News.
© 2026 The Republic Project. All rights reserved. Research, analytical frameworks, and original editorial content are protected intellectual property. Reproduction or redistribution requires authorization, except as permitted by applicable law.
END OF REPORT
